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MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1672



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## USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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'WHENCE THE THREAT TO PEACE' SUMMARIZED

Moscow SCVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 82 pp 43-44

[Book review by K. Valentinov: "Whence the Threat to Peace"]

[Text]

THE QUESTION of the causes that led to the present crisis of détente and the new round of the arms race triggered off by the Reagan Administration are focussing the attention of the world public. To justify this course, the myth of "Soviet military threat" is being backed up by claims that the USA has "fallen behind" the USSR in the military field, that "windows of vulnerability" have appeared in the US war machine, and the like.

At the end of September 1981 the Pentagon issued millions of copies of a pamphlet, entitled "Soviet Military Power," and spread it in many countries of the world. The purpose of this pamphlet is to put the blame for the aggravation of the international situation in the 1980s on the Soviet Union.

It is quite evident that this purpose predetermined both the content of the pamphlet and the manner of presentation. Its authors analyse the problem in a biased, one-sided and unobjective manner. Exaggerating the Soviet military potential, they say nothing about the military might of the USA and other NATO countries, nor do they show the real relationship between the armed strength of the two sides proceeding from comparative data. This is not accidental because the Pentagon leaders themselves have of late repeatedly announced that there is an approximate parity between the two military potentials.

Today such an objective admission would inevitably refute the main argument on which the whole present military-political strategy of the USA is based, i. e. under cover of the myth of Soviet military superiority fabricated by the Pentagon, to implement a new extensive programme aimed at militarising the NATO countries to attain military supremacy over the Soviet Union and the

Warsaw Treaty countries.

To expose the Pentagon lies and falsifications in this field, it became necessary to present strictly objective information on the US military potential and to examine without prejudice the real balance of NATO-Warsaw Treaty military strength. This is the purpose of the book "Whence the Threat to Peace" published in January 1982 by the Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defence.

The book is prepared by competent Soviet quarters and is based on carefully checked and objective facts. It makes wide use of not only Soviet sources but also of data drawn from investigations and materials of the London International Institute for Strategic Studies and of official US sources, none of which can be suspected of the slightest sympathy for the Soviet Union.

First of all it should be noted that facts and figures contained in the book under review convincingly show who is to blame for the arms race and who initiated the creation and development of new types of lethal weapons.

The Soviet Union has initiated no new types of weapons throughout postwar history. A table given in the book convincingly shows that the initiator was always the USA. For example, nuclear weapons: the USA created them in the mid-1940s, the USSR in the late 1940s; intercontinental strategic bombers: the USA — mid-1950s, the USSR — late 1950s; nuclear-powered submarines: the USA — mid-1950s, the USSR — late 1950s; multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles: the USA — late 1960s, the USSR — mid-1970s.

As can be seen, the Soviet Union has always been forced to react to dangers created by the United States and to create in turn the required armaments. But the USSR has never sought and does not seek to achieve military superiority in spite of its great military potential. It has always confined itself to measures which sufficed to ensure dependable security for itself and its allies. In his replies to "Time" magazine, Leonid Brezhnev said: "We are not seeking military superiority over the West, we do not need it. All we need is reliable security."

The actual balance of forces proves that. In its "Soviet Military Power" pamphlet the US Defence Department says that the Soviet Union has 1,398 ICBM launchers, 950 SLBM launchers, and 156 heavy bombers with a total payload of 7,000 nuclear weapons. These figures, taken in isolation, sound impressive. But the authors of the Pen-

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\* "Whence the Threat to Peace." Military Publishing House, Moscow, 1982 (in English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish).

tagon pamphlet make no mention of the 10,000 nuclear weapons of the US strategic offensive forces, which have 1,053 ICBM launchers, 648 SLBM launchers, over 570 heavy bombers and 65 medium bombers. In addition, the book notes, the USA has thousands of aircraft in its forward-based forces in proximity of Soviet territory in Europe, the Far East and in the Indian Ocean.

It should be also borne in mind that the Soviet Union is confronted not only by the United States, but also by two other Western nuclear powers, and that the threat of China's nuclear forces is, for the time being, more serious for the Soviet Union than for the United States.

The book "Whence the Threat to Peace" unmasks the tendentiously selected and deliberately distorted information about the Soviet Armed Forces contained in the Pentagon pamphlet and shows the actual correlation of military forces between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. The book presents data that show the far-fetchedness of a howl raised by NATO about an "unbearable superiority" of the USSR in medium-range weapons. On November 6, 1981 Marshal of the Soviet Union, Minister of Defence of the USSR D. F. Ustinov said in this connection: "I can confirm in all responsibility that a rough parity in strategic nuclear arms, medium-range nuclear weapons and conventional armaments exists between the Soviet Union and the United States, and between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO." But in the event of another 572 new nuclear medium-range missiles being deployed in Western Europe, the parity of nuclear weapons in Europe would be upset seriously in NATO's favour.

The book "Whence the Threat to Peace" convincingly refutes allegations that the Soviet Union seeks a "global projection of Soviet military power." It is a commonly known fact that the Soviet Union has military contingents only in the territory of some of its East European allies and in neighbouring Mongolia and Afghanistan and this, moreover, strictly in conformity with treaty provisions. At the same time the United States has more than 1,500 military bases and installations in the territory of 32 countries where over 500,000 American officers and men are stationed. These bases are being used by the USA not only to threaten the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community but also to exert direct pressure on the governments of the developing countries, to keep them in the mainstream of US policy, and to suppress national-liberation movements by armed force.

Having announced the strategy of "direct confrontation" between the USA and the USSR on a global and regional scale, the Reagan Administra-

tion strives to establish, with the help of military might, the world hegemony of American imperialism. For this purpose the USA is whipping up the arms race. The book of the USSR Defence Ministry discloses the US line aimed at achieving military superiority over the USSR. The main emphasis is laid on building up the strategic offensive forces. The so-called "comprehensive strategic programme" for the 1980s announced by the White House is characterised even in the USA as the biggest in the past 20 years.

In addition to the massive equipment of the armed forces with new weapons, the US military and political leadership devotes ever greater attention to developing, improving, deploying and stockpiling neutron, chemical and biological weapons.

The book notes that the aggressive course pursued by the USA finds expression in the steady increase in the military expenditures of the country and its NATO allies. During the past 20 years (1960-80) US military spending under the National Defence Programme has trebled — from 45 to 135 billion dollars. By the end of 1985 it will reach 303.9 billion dollars and in fiscal 1986 342.7 billion dollar.

The book "Whence the Threat to Peace" analyses the Soviet defensive strategy and the American aggressive military doctrine. The Soviet military doctrine has been and is based on the principle of retaliatory, i. e. defensive actions, on the principle that the USSR will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. In fact, it is opposed to the use of any weapon of mass destruction and advocates complete renunciation by the two sides—West and East—of all types of such weapons and the solution of all disputable problems by talks.

The US military doctrine provides for delivering a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the USSR, for the multi-purpose use of nuclear weapons, for the possibility of waging a "limited" nuclear war outside the territory of the United States. It is aimed at establishing hegemony and direct domination of the USA over other countries and nations by using armed force.

This is the truth about the man-hating American imperialism threatening all the peoples of the world.

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## ARMED FORCES

### LENIN'S ROLE IN USSR ARMED FORCES ORGANIZATION DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 82 pp 6-7, 10

[Article by Col I. Klimov, Cand. Sci. (Philosophy): "V.I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces"]

[Text]

**M**ILITARY construction and defence problems occupied a major place in V. I. Lenin's exceptionally versatile and comprehensive work in the field of the theory and practice of socialism. He developed the teaching on the defence of socialism, laid down the socio-political principles of military construction, the principles of organisation of the socialist Armed Forces, the principles of education and training of military personnel.

The teaching on the defence of the Socialist Fatherland explains the necessity for the victorious proletariat to defend their socialist state against imperialist aggression, outlines the forms of defence, indicates the directions of economic, moral, political, scientific and technical preparation of the country for defence, describes the military organisation of a socialist state, emphasises the leading and directing role of the Communist Party in strengthening the country's defence capacity.

The teaching on the defence of the Socialist Fatherland constitutes an important part of V. I. Lenin's teaching on the socialist revolution. The concepts of this teaching shape CPSU policy in military construction and the leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces.

**T**HE BASIC socio-political principles of military construction worked out by V. I. Lenin are: the Communist Party's leadership of the Armed Forces, the class approach to building the army, unbreakable unity of the army and the people, proletarian socialist internationalism, friendship of peoples.

V. I. Lenin regarded the Party's leadership as a major factor of the Armed Forces' combat capacity. Speaking to the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party in March 1920, he pointed out that



the country could repel all the onslaughts of the imperialist Entente "only because of the Party's vigilance and its strict discipline, because the authority of the Party united all government departments and institutions, because the slogans issued by the Central Committee were adopted by tens, hundreds, thousands and finally millions of people as one man." Using V. I. Lenin's same words one can also say that "the Party's vigilance" during the Great Patriotic war was a major factor of the Soviet Union's victory over Nazi Germany. The Party has been true to this behest of the leader in peace time too. The CPSU programme states: "Party leadership of the Armed Forces, and the increasing role and influence of the Party organisations in the Army and Navy are the bedrock of military development."

The army of the young Soviet republic was formed on a strictly class principle as an army of workers and peasants. This determined its essentially new, genuinely popular social role and gave a new meaning to its life and activities. It is the direct antipode of a bourgeois army, which has always served the interests of the oppressors and has been as V. I. Lenin said "the weapon of reaction, the servant of capital in its struggle against labour, the executioner of the people's liberty." The building of a new army with the just and noble aims of defending the revolutionary gains of the working people was only possible under a socialist system. For the first time in history the guns of the army were directed not against the people but in defence of their interests, not to grab foreign lands but to defend the Republic of Soviets from its enemies.

Socially the Soviet Armed Forces are today a replica of developed socialist society. They reflect the essence, the features and the regularities of mature socialism: powerful productive forces, advanced science and culture, mature social relationships, conscientious organisation and discipline, genuine and comprehensive democracy.

The unbreakable unity of the army and the broad masses of people constitutes in V. I. Lenin's view an important element of the defence concept. This indissoluble unity is a guarantee of the invincibility of the Soviet Armed Forces. The army has ceased for the first time to be a bogey to the people. V. I. Lenin said: "...now we need not be afraid of the man with the gun because he protects the working people and will be ruthless in suppressing the rule of the exploiters."

In organising the defence of the Soviet Republic against imperialist intervention V. I. Lenin attributed special significance to combining the military efforts of all the fraternal nations. He saw a powerful source of the Soviet Army's strength in the friendship of nations and internationalism. Nations

who have chosen the path of socialist development, V. I. Lenin stressed, must absolutely have a close economic and military alliance. Any attempt to upset this alliance, he said, should be regarded as disloyalty and treachery to the cause of socialism.

An example of such an alliance today is the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, which was set up in response to the aggressive imperialist NATO bloc in order to ensure the security of the socialist states and to maintain peace in Europe.

The military-political alliance of the socialist states, the 26th CPSU Congress stated, has been loyal to the cause of peace, but it has everything necessary to reliably protect the socialist gains of the fraternal nations. The Soviet Armed Forces, in close combat alliance with the fraternal armies, are carrying out this historic mission with honour and dignity.

**T**HE BASIC organisational principles laid down by V. I. Lenin for the Soviet Armed Forces are: the regular army principle, the principle of centralism, unity of command, conscientious military discipline, constant battle readiness.

Defence of the socialist gains, according to V. I. Lenin, is an objective necessity and the closest concern of every socialist state. He taught that no revolution is worth anything unless it can defend itself.

V. I. Lenin put forward and proved the concept of a strong regular army. The Communist Party led by V. I. Lenin built such an army. This army effectively protected the revolutionary gains in the hardest and most complicated years of the Civil War and foreign military intervention and routed the combined forces of counter-revolution.

The Soviet Army destroyed the bulk of Nazi Germany's forces, dealt a crushing blow to the Japanese militarist army in the Far East, and decided the defeat of fascism in World War II. It brought freedom from foreign oppression to numerous peoples of Europe and Asia, fulfilling its patriotic and internationalist duty.

Nowadays, the Soviet Armed Forces are the object of constant care on the part of the Soviet people, the Party and the Government, and have become ever more powerful. They possess everything necessary to give a rebuff to any aggressor and to fulfil the mission assigned by the 26th Party Congress — to stand fast on guard over the peaceful creative labour of the Soviet people.

The principle of centralism constitutes, in V. I. Lenin's view, a strong aspect of military organisation. It implies a system of organisation and leadership of the Armed Forces which provides for their single command and the subordination of lower bodies to the superior ones. Only strict

centralisation of leadership can ensure coordinated, flexible and efficient control of the forces and maximum use of their combat capabilities.

Unity of command is part and parcel of centralisation and constitutes a major organisational principle of the Soviet Armed Forces. Unity of command implies concentration of powers over the troops in the hands of a single commander. Unity of command has developed in the Soviet Armed Forces on the Party basis. All the commander's activities are aligned with and directed by the policy of the CPSU, as directed by the CPSU Central Committee. The main instrument for strengthening unity of command is Party-political work, the efforts of commanders, political organs, Party and Komsomol organisations aimed at the ideological, political, military and moral education of the personnel.

V. I. Lenin attributed exceptionally great significance to strengthening military discipline. Good organisation and discipline, he stressed, ensure flexibility and continuity of control and provide for better mobility and manoeuvrability of the forces in the battlefield. "Military organisation is good only because it is flexible and is able at the same time to give millions of people a single will." V. I. Lenin made a deep study of the class content of Soviet military discipline and demonstrated its radical difference from discipline of bourgeois armies. The discipline of the army is part of the discipline of the whole state. Consequently, army discipline reflects the structure of class relationships which exist in society as a whole. In a bourgeois army military discipline is and has always been an instrument of domination of the ruling class. In contrast to this, military discipline in the Soviet Armed Forces has been an instrument of integration and class cohesion and serves to consolidate the socialist state and social system.

V. I. Lenin's ideas on military discipline have great significance at the present time. The CPSU invariably follows them as it takes steps to promote the defence capacity of the country and to build up the combat strength of the Armed Forces.

V. I. Lenin attached great importance to the defence potential of the Soviet state and insistently called for maintaining the Armed Forces in constant combat readiness. He warned that the imperialists would not reconcile themselves with defeat and would continue to hatch up new adventurist schemes against the country of victorious socialism.

Lenin's forecasts were justified. Reactionary militarist forces, especially in the US, continue to work out new military doctrines which are dan-

gerous for peace, and speed up the arms race, develop advanced and ever inhuman and murderous weapons and are preparing to deploy hundreds of modern nuclear missiles in Europe.

The aggressive circles whip up political tensions in the world, use the language of threats and openly claim the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of other peoples and nations. They seek to adapt the mentality of the peoples to the idea that nuclear war is admissible.

In these conditions the CPSU and the Soviet state leadership, true to V. I. Lenin's behests, has taken a firm stand to implement the Peace Programme adopted by the 24th, and further developed by the 25th and 26th Party congresses, while at the same time taking every necessary measure to build up the defence capacity of the USSR and raise the combat power of the Soviet Armed Forces. L. I. Brezhnev addressing the 26th Congress said: "In the period under review the Party and the Government did not for a single day lose sight of questions related to strengthening the nation's defence potential, its Armed Forces. The international situation obliges us to do this."

V. I. Lenin associated the task of building up the country's defence potential and the army's combat capability above all with the process of equipping the armed forces with modern weapons and materiel. He said: "...those who have the greatest technical equipment, organisation and discipline, and the best machines, will gain the upper hand."

In strengthening Soviet state's defence capacity V. I. Lenin laid considerable stress on military education and combat training. He insisted on the need to learn military science and all aspects of war in a proper way, he called for perfect knowledge of weapons and skill in handling them.

V. I. Lenin believed that the fighting capacity and combat readiness of the army, its might and strength depended to a great extent on its morale and combat spirit.

The CPSU and the Soviet Government have invariably followed these directions in military construction. The Soviet Armed Forces demonstrated their superior fighting power and skill, their unbending determination and tenacity in the Great Patriotic War battles, unprecedented in scope and fierceness, against the Nazi hordes. The Soviet Army has retained and improved these superior qualities ever since. Assessing the present state of the Armed Forces L. I. Brezhnev pointed out at the 26th Party Congress: "The combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces is a durable alloy of high technology, military skill, and indomitable morale."

Powerful modern weapons and combat equip-

ment are in the skilled and confident hands of Soviet soldiers. During field training, missile launching exercises, in performing their peace-time duty on land, in the air and at sea they demonstrate a high standard of combat and political training.

Once again it was shown at the "Zapad-81" manoeuvres, and L. I. Brezhnev highly assessed their performance. These manoeuvres were a test of the combat skills and an account of the Armed Forces rendered to the CPSU on the state of their readiness.

The combat spirit and morale of the Soviet Armed Forces are as high as ever. The servicemen are politically loyal, morally sound and socially active. They are boundlessly devoted to their Motherland, to the lofty ideals of the CPSU and stand firmly shoulder to shoulder under the Leninist banner. They are all inspired by the immortal ideas of V. I. Lenin, the great revolutionary, Communist, internationalist, unbending champion of the happiness of the people, whose name is associated with all the outstanding revolutionary events of the 20th century.

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## ARMED FORCES

### EDUCATION SCIENCE IN USSR ARMED FORCES DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 82 pp 28-29

[Article by Col Yu. Moshkov, under the rubric "The Making of a Soldier":  
"The Method of Individual Approach"]

[Text]

The components of the USSR Armed Forces' military potential, side by side with sophisticated equipment, are combat skill and invincible morale of the personnel. Combat skill and high moral and combat qualities are developed in servicemen in the course of daily training and education. This process just like any other process of the pedagogical and psychological influence on people is complex. The complexity is accounted for in the first place by the fact that each man has his individual features, cast of character, habits, inclinations, professional and moral qualities, level of intellect and physical development, etc. characteristic of him alone. It is absolutely natural that different people often perceive one and the same phenomenon in different ways.

Of course, at the age of 18, when a young man is called up, he has already more or less definite views on life because behind him he has either secondary, vocational or technical education. He might even have had time to work in production. The overwhelming majority of the young men called up for military service have acquired habits of socio-political work in VCL organisations. Therefore a sense of collectivism, Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism are characteristic of all young soldiers. But these features, common to all Soviet people, are developed in them in different measures, depending again on the individual peculiarities of the personality.

Soviet military pedagogy considers the principle of individual approach most important in the training and education of servicemen. The essence of individual approach is that general methods, means and forms of training and education are applied to each man in strict conformity with his characteristic abilities. This obliges the commander, political worker and all leaders to know thoroughly each man as a personality.

What then are the component parts of individual work? It is first of all study of the personal qualities of each serviceman, his strong and weak points from the viewpoint of mi-

litary service. Methods of pedagogical influence with the help of which necessary positive qualities of the serviceman's personality could be formed or further developed and shortcomings hindering the successful carrying out of service eliminated, are chosen on this basis. After that comes the practical application of methods of pedagogical influence on the serviceman for the purpose of accelerating the formation in him of high moral, political and combat qualities. And finally a systematic analysis of the results is required for the purpose of outlining further tasks of individual work.

Let us examine briefly all these components.

Study of the men. This is by no means a simple matter because one really gets to know a person only in the process of work, life and social activity. V. I. Lenin taught that there was only one sign by which the real thoughts and feelings of various personalities could be judged: their actions.

What must be known concretely about the subordinates? General biographical data: family name, name, patronymic, date of birth, education, Party membership, family status, conditions in which he was brought up, studied and was educated, occupation before service in the army; moral and political qualities characterising the level of his conscientiousness, his ideals, interests, attitude to service, abilities and inclinations—attentiveness, memory, will-power, temperament and ease of speech; health condition—physical development, endurance, degree of development of skills and ability to look after himself, etc.; achievements and shortcomings in combat training and political education, attitude to his military speciality and the service as a whole, character of mutual relations with the collective, participation in social work and socialist emulation; material and spiritual needs, degree of their satisfaction and help required.

It must be noted that military pedagogy and psychology do not merely recommend to know subordinates. It is a requirement stipulated in the corresponding article of the USSR Armed Forces Interior Service Regulations in which the commanders' official duties are stated. From squad to company (battery) commanders must know well each of their subordinates.

Some of the information about the serviceman is obtained by studying the questionnaires and by talks with them. (For instance, biographical particulars). But the subordinates' personal qualities are studied mainly by observation in the process of service and in out-of-service time and by personal contact. In the course of such observation commanders and political workers gradually accumulate data characterising the subordinates: their service reliability, quickness of response, persistence in achieving set aims, mental and physical abilities, strength of positive and negative emotions, sociability or seclusiveness, striving to help comrades or downright selfishness and other aspects of the personality.

The results of this observation are supplemented with data received by other methods: individual talks with the subordinates, their immediate superiors, their fellow-service-

men, Party and Komsomol activists. Such thorough study of the men helps commanders and political workers to choose correctly the methods of pedagogical influence over the subordinates and carry them out in practice.

Let us illustrate this by a concrete example. Two young soldiers, Privates N. Simonov and A. Panchuk were violating discipline: they were late to form up, made their beds badly or absented themselves without the surgeon's permission. After observing them the platoon commander, Lieutenant S. Nikishin, came to the conclusion that Private N. Simonov violated the order envisaged by the Regulations because he did everything very slowly and inattentively. Private A. Panchuk, on the contrary, was very cool and quick to respond to things, and his failings occurred because of his desire to stand out among his mates and maybe because childish mischievousness still persisted in him. Naturally Lieutenant S. Nikishin's response to these soldiers' breach of discipline was varied. It was sufficient to have a talk or two with Private S. Simonov and train him to carry out commands and he corrected his errors of behaviour. With Private Panchuk the talk took a stricter tone. When a warning had no effect the officer took disciplinary action against the soldier in front of the platoon formation. It is true that wounded pride had a negative effect at the time and not long after Panchuk again violated discipline. But a repeated, more severe punishment and discussion of Panchuk's behaviour, as a member of the Komsomol, at a meeting of the YCL bureau on the Lieutenant's advice had a positive influence on the soldier. After that there were no complaints about his service.

The practice of educational work has led to the working out of definite methods of pedagogical influence upon subordinates. They include individual talks, which are important not only for studying the personal qualities of men, but also for influencing them. In heart to heart talks educators share their thoughts with the men, give advice, find out their opinions, analyse their misbehaviour or delusions and convince the men of their erroneousness. If the talks turn into the usual official telling-offs, that is, when the commander speaks and the subordinate just listens, no good will come out of it.

It is important also to organise individual help for men who need it both by the commander, Party and Komsomol activists and also by his comrades-in-arms. This help is rendered unobtrusively and tactfully so that the man feels the sincere striving of the fellow-serviceman to render him assistance for the best of motives.

Drawing servicemen into the collective's social life plays a big role. Active participation in the work of the Komsomol organisation, in making and designing visual aids, in amateur art groups, in sports events and in fulfilling social assignments — all this helps the man to develop collectivism, responsibility for assigned tasks, irreconcilability with shortcomings, persistence, initiative and self-criticism.

A systematic analysis of individual work with subordinates and the results achieved allows commanders and poli-

tical workers to correct, if necessary, the methods they use for it in the subunits, to determine the suitability or necessity to use other forms and means of pedagogical influence on the personality of this or that man.

What conditions guarantee the effectiveness of individual work as a whole and how effective is its influence on the formation of high moral, political and combat qualities in the men?

The aim of the educators is to apply the principle of individual approach constantly in the process of training and education, not just occasionally, and in respect of all the men without exception and without fail. It must be admitted that sometimes commanders begin to get interested in individual personalities only after they had caused trouble or fulfilled their combat training assignment badly. Some collectives seldom pay attention to soldiers who have mediocre results in studies. All this may lead to lowering results of studies and the men may end up among the backward ones.

A most essential condition for individual work to be effective is to lean on the personality's positive qualities, for everybody has some. It is important to help a man develop these qualities and rely on them to solve tasks of improving him. Shouting alone and constant underlining of shortcomings never educated anyone.

Ensuring unity, coordination and continuity of the educating influence of commanders, political workers, Party and Komsomol organisation is also an important factor of success in individual work. This is understandable. If, for instance, a platoon commander has a certain opinion about Private Petrov, the squad commander, another and the Komsomol bureau, a third and all begin educating the soldier, proceeding from their own notions then, of course, their efforts would go to pot.

Experience shows that the individual approach had the biggest effect in subunits in which the commanders and political workers ensured unity of individual and mass forms of training and education, which are closely linked and supplement and enrich each other.

The individual approach helps to forecast a man's behaviour, to set tasks which he is capable of fulfilling, to give social assignment taking into account his abilities and inclinations, to prevent in time any mistakes and misbehaviour on his part and to correctly settle conflicts that spring up. All this contributes to the cohesion of military collectives, to the further raising units' and subunits' combat readiness.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAINING IN USSR ARMED FORCES DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 82 pp 30-31

[Article by Col L. Fedorov: "Psychological Readiness for Battle"]

[Text]

**T**HE PURPOSE of psychological training for battle is to form in the men such necessary qualities as courage and bravery, staunchness and quick response in most complicated conditions. Daily training in a situation closely resembling real battle provides favourable conditions for the men's moral steeling and for improving their combat skill and readiness for action. Those in charge of the training process must skillfully use these conditions so as to obtain the best results in combat training.

There are different methods of making combat training closely resemble real fighting, their use mainly depending on the purpose of the relevant arm of the service. However, all these methods are designed to create great mental, physical and psychological strain, such as may be imposed on the men during an encounter with the enemy. This accounts for the important role played by the men's training in difficult conditions on land, at sea or in the air.

The importance of psychological readiness for battle has grown immeasurably. The real conditions of modern battle will make an extremely deep emotional impression on the men and make them feel more keenly; their psychological steeling obtained in daily training will serve as a basis for overcoming negative factors and for preserving their psychological stability and will to win in any situation.

Being in charge of his subordinates' training the commander must clearly realise that real battle presents many surprises and this, naturally, cannot be experienced in full measure during combat training. On the battlefield the men have to face enormous destruction, heavy losses in men and also new enemy tactics. It is therefore important



to foresee what effect the surprise factor may have on the men's behaviour in action.

As is known, the more violent the irritation, the more negative consequences it may cause. In modern combat conditions this means that surprise may substantially complicate the fulfilment of combat missions. This accounts for the increased necessity to gain experience of how to behave on the field of battle in most complicated situations. It is, therefore, not without reason that practical training now includes such elements as reproducing battle noises, flying over battle formations at low altitudes, firing over the men's heads, men being driven over by tanks, landing on unfamiliar terrain, mastering ship's damage control technique and so on.

The effect of a combat situation on the emotions and sensations is a complicated process which enhances the men's positive feelings and thus raises their combat spirit. However, those who lack psychological steeling may give way to uncertainty and confusion, and this will adversely affect their combat activity. To exclude the possibility of such a negative effect in battle, it is necessary persistently to work to develop the men's psychological stability in the course of training.

Fear is the most common feeling negatively affecting the men's combat activity. In the face of danger in battle this feeling may have a disorganising effect on the men's actions. However, in response to danger a strong-willed man may feel a greater incitement to fight and control his actions by an act of will. Hence, during psychological training, particular attention should be paid to cultivate in the men persistence and poise, resolve and courage and to develop their self-control in dangerous and difficult situations.

The commander plays a decisive role in developing his subordinates' firm resolve to carry out any combat mission. He must constantly guide his men on the battlefield, be well aware of the situation, ready to take a decision and maintain perfect order and discipline. The one-man commander must set an example to his subordinates by his behaviour. Being always in sight of his men, his actions orientate them in any situation. The last war's experience shows what a great inspiration the commander's example may be to his subordinates. This applies equally to their daily training conditions. When confronted with the conventional enemy, experienced commanders exacting towards themselves make wide use of the effect of personal example on their subordinates so as to achieve high results.

The following instance may well illustrate this. During a tactical exercise Captain Pavlov's men

were operating in an extremely complicated situation. They attacked an "enemy's" strong point, repulsed counterattacking infantry and tanks and negotiated a "radioactive contamination" zone. Then they were ordered to cross a water barrier under "enemy" fire. The men coped with this mission and destroyed several weapon emplacements. At the critique it was pointed out that all the participants in the exercise had shown a high training standard. It was also stressed that every man had been able to display all his abilities thanks to the exemplary behaviour of the subunit commander, who had a sound knowledge of the situation, took well-grounded decisions, gave clear-cut orders and was confident in victory over the "enemy."

Captain Pavlov attaches much importance to his subordinates' psychological steeling. He requires his platoon and section commanders to follow suit. This has a favourable effect on the men's achievements in combat training. When mastering combat training elements, no simplification of the training process is allowed in the subunit. Simulators, training films and the like are used to reproduce a real battle situation.

Different military specialists carry out their duties in different conditions. This accounts for the necessity to perform the appropriate physical exercises with the men operating combat equipment, as Captain Pavlov and other commanders do.

This point may be illustrated by the work of an ATGM layer-operator. In this quality he has to stay in a static position for a long time, and this causes a particular kind of fatigue. Besides, noises produced by the equipment and the flickering of the screen also lower his attention. In order to reduce the effect of these negative factors it is expedient to practise exercises enhancing the specialist's response to any change in the situation, improving his vestibular apparatus and spatial orientation. If this man has to perform his duties for a long period, it is a good practice for him to carry out the following gymnastics: circular motions of the head, turns, bends and the like.

A scientifically substantiated methodology has been developed to enhance the physical fitness of military specialists. Using the recommended sets of exercises it is important to stick to the appropriate dosage of physical strain and to concentrate on exercises which contribute to improving the specialists' qualification.

The state of nervous strain produced by a combat situation may have an undesirable effect on a man's activity. A moderate strain is a positive factor which stirs the man to activity, intensifying his psychological functions and reducing the time

during which he has to adapt himself to the situation. Whereas excessive strain may adversely affect the personality: on the one hand, the man may cease activity altogether, lose the ability to coordinate his movements and suffer loss of memory and, on the other hand, he may lose control of his actions and behave chaotically.

When does the man's nervous strain cease to stir him to activity and become a disorganising factor? This question can be answered only by a commander working in a concrete situation with men whose psychological qualities are well known to him. If the men have to work in conditions close to critical, no angry cries or sharp words are tolerable. Instead of rallying the men, this may cause them to make errors, omissions or to violate the specified time parameters laid down by the schedule or separate operation procedures. Words of encouragement are more useful in such circumstances.

Commanders must see the signs characterising the men's condition. Knowing their character they must be able to influence them properly so as to remove excessive strain in good time.

Modern battle will greatly affect the whole personality. Commanders and political workers must therefore give themselves entirely to their duties. They must be competent specialists with a broad political outlook, and be proficient in psychology and pedagogics. The man's psychological functions depend on his character and psychological inclinations which, in turn, are based on his world outlook. Hence the importance of a scientific world outlook and firm ideological convictions in military personnel and as well as a highly conscientious attitude to their soldier's duty to defend their country. Only those men who possess all these qualities will be able to cope with their combat mission.

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## ARMED FORCES

### BATTLES OF 1942 DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 82 pp 35-37

[Article by Col A. Orlov, Cand. Sci. (History), under the rubric "Military History": "When the Tide Began to Turn"]

[Text]

The year 1942 went down in history as the year of the beginning of a radical turn in the course of the Second World War in favour of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. The main and decisive role in this respect was played by the Soviet Union, which stopped the advance of the Nazi hordes near Moscow and hurled them back, and then delivered them a crushing blow at Stalingrad. It was the Battle of Stalingrad, which had no precedent by its scope and historical results, that made the decisive contribution to achieving a turn in the course of the Great Patriotic War and the whole of the Second World War.

Even today the bourgeois history writers try to put the Battle of Stalingrad on a par for its significance with the operations of the Western Allies in North Africa and the Pacific Ocean, to reduce it to the level of a local event, important only for the Soviet-German front, to show it as an ordinary battle in series which marked the beginning of the turn in the war. And what is more the falsifiers of history assert that operations of the British forces at El Alamein (Egypt), the combat actions of the USA against Japan: the naval battle at Midway Atoll and the battles for the Guadalcanal Island in the Pacific — had already predetermined the passing over of the strategic initiative to the allies, while Stalingrad had only crowned it. That is what the American historian E. Zinke, former British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan — the authors of the English "History of the 20th Century" and a number of other bourgeois scientists write.

However, if one objectively analyses the importance, scope and results of the combat actions which took place in 1942 on the Soviet-German front and in the other theatres of operations, the picture painted by the bourgeois historians will

prove to be far from true. How did the events really develop?

The year 1942 on the Soviet-German front began with a general winter offensive of the Soviet Army which developed the counteroffensive at Moscow. It spread to a front of 2,000 km long and continued up to the April of 1942. The Soviet Army drove the enemy back some 100-350 km to the west and destroyed 500,000 officers and men, 1,300 tanks, 2,500 artillery pieces and a great quantity of other equipment. To replace the losses the Nazi Command was forced to send several dozen divisions from Germany and the occupied countries to the Eastern front. The Battle of Moscow shattered the myth of the "invincibility" of the Nazi Wehrmacht, buried for ever the plan of the Blitzkrieg and thus began a radical turn in the course of the Second World War.

From the summer onwards active combat actions developed on the south wing of the Soviet-German front. The enemy was striving to reach Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The Battle of Stalingrad, which had been going on for more than half a year, from July 17, 1942 to February 2, 1943, became the major event. The apotheosis of this battle was the encirclement and destruction of the 330,000 strong enemy grouping. Total losses of the enemy comprised 1,500,000 officers and men (more than 25 per cent of all Nazi forces operating on the Soviet-German front), over 3,500 tanks, 24,000 artillery pieces and 4,300 combat planes. The Soviet Army wrested the initiative from the enemy and firmly retained it up to the end of the war. The victory of Soviet arms at Stalingrad shook to its very foundation Nazi Germany, the major and the most powerful force of the fascist-military bloc, roused disorder among her satellites, activated the resistance movement in the Nazi occupied countries. Estimating the feat of arms of the Soviet forces at Stalingrad, F. Roosevelt, President of the USA, pointed out that "their glorious victory stemmed the tide of invasion and marked the turning point in the war of the Allied Nations against the forces of aggression."

Operations were actively carried out in 1942 also at the front in North Africa. Here in the first half of the year the 8th British Army had left Libya under the blow of the German-Italian forces and retreated to Egyptian territory, where it took up defensive positions on a fortified line in the area of El Alamein. In autumn, when the attention of the Nazi Command was turned to Stalingrad, the Allies, making use of the favourable situation, carried out the El Alamein offensive and the North-African landing operation (codenamed "Torch").



At El Alamein the 8th British Army (230,000 officers and men, 1,440 tanks, over 2,300 guns and 1,500 combat planes) having begun the offensive on October 23, broke through the enemy defences by November 4 and defeated the opposing German-Italian grouping (80,000 officers and men, 540 tanks, over 1,200 guns and 350 combat planes). The nazi forces retreated to Tunisia. In November 1942, the British-American troops landed in Morocco and Algeria and, not meeting any resistance advanced along the littoral to Tunis where they were stopped by the enemy. The main thing was that the Allies seized important strategic bases in North Africa and created the conditions for successfully completing the entire campaign.

In the Pacific Ocean and Southeast Asia during the winter of 1941-42 the Japanese captured a number of strategic points and occupied vast territories (Hong Kong, Singapore, British Malaya, a part of Burma, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies and a major part of New Guinea). In June a naval battle took place at Midway Atoll in which the American Fleet took the upper hand over the Japanese Fleet, destroying four Japanese aircraft carriers and over 330 combat planes. It was the Allies' first success in the Pacific theatre. But although the correlation of forces at sea had changed in favour of the USA, the Japanese continued to advance on New Guinea and in November launched an offensive on the Solomon Islands. In August the American army and navy began the battle for Guadalcanal. However, despite the superiority in forces (58,000 against 30,000) they were unable to capture it a long time. The Japanese garrison and their navy put up a stubborn resistance. Only early in February 1943 (just after the capitulation of the nazi grouping at Stalingrad) did the Japanese abandon the island, evacuating some 11,000 officers and men. The Japanese historians confess that it was precisely after Stalingrad that "the confidence of the Japanese military-political leadership in the strength of the nazi army was, for the first time, really shaken." Though the battle at Midway and operations for Guadalcanal testified to a turn in favour of the allies in the Pacific Ocean, F. D. Roosevelt considered them "essentially defensive," a part of "the strategic holding which characterised this phase of the war."

The Battle of Stalingrad was of different importance. Assessing it L. I. Brezhnev pointed out: "At that battle not only the crack hitlerite troops were crushed. Here their offensive spirit petered out and the morale of nazism was broken. The nazi bloc began to fall to pieces. The strength of those who did not bend their heads to the nazi invaders doubled. The word 'Stalingrad' passed from mouth to mouth like a password of resistance, a pas-

sword of victory."

So far as the fighting in Africa and the Pacific was concerned, the allies having passed over to the offensive in these secondary theatres of military operations, made a certain contribution to the achievement of the turn. But this contribution can by no means be compared in importance with the Battle of Stalingrad. Here are some figures to illustrate this. In the Battle of Stalingrad at different stages up to 2,000,000 officers and men participated on both sides. At El Alamein the total strength of the forces on both sides was 310,000 officers and men and during the fighting for Guadalcanal nearly 90,000. In the Battle of Stalingrad the enemy lost 1,500,000 officers and men, in the El Alamein operation 55,000 and at Guadalcanal nearly 25,000 men. The course and results of the Battle of Stalingrad influenced to a considerable extent combat actions of the allies. In the summer of 1942, while elaborating operation "Torch" D. Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces, stressed that the stubborn resistance of the Russians secured to the Allies the freedom of choice of place, time and quantity of forces for the decisive offensive. The situation on the Eastern front comprising 75 per cent of the nazi forces, did not allow the nazi Command to relieve its forces in Africa, numbering only 1.5 per cent. When analysing the offensive of the Americans in North Africa G. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the US Army, pointed out that these actions would not force Hitler to face the south and that they proceeded from the fact that he was stuck fast in Russia. Indeed, the nazi Command in 1942 alone was forced to transfer 69 divisions from Western Europe to the Soviet-German front.

While analysing military-political situation in 1942 one should note that the opening of a second front by the Western Allies would be of great importance for the course of the war. Talks on this question between the USSR, the USA and Great Britain were carried out in May-June. Opening a second front would have meant developing operations of the Anglo-American forces in Western Europe on the shortest routes to nazi Germany for the purpose of drawing off 30-40 divisions of the Wehrmacht from the Eastern front. On June 12, a communiqué was published in Moscow, Washington and London which said that complete agreement relating to the urgent tasks of opening a second front in Europe in 1942 had been achieved. These obligations were undertaken by the governments of the USA and Great Britain to a considerable extent under pressure of public opinion. However, the ruling circles of these countries did not fulfil them. Instead the USA and Great Britain limited their activity by landing

their forces in North Africa asserting that this landing was similar in significance to opening a second front. On August 14, 1942 W. Churchill wrote to J. V. Stalin: "The best second front in 1942, and the only large-scale operation possible from the Atlantic, is 'Torch.'" F. Roosevelt declared that landing of the Allied Troops in North Africa would render their glorious Allies in Russia assistance of the same order as opening a second front.

Such an approach to the problem of opening a second front evidently did not correspond to the agreement which had been reached between the USSR, the USA and Great Britain. The landing in Africa could not replace a second front because this theatre of operations was removed from the vitally important areas of Germany and operations in this theatre did not threaten the existence of the Third Reich, did not engage large forces of the Wehrmacht. In the postwar period Western historians such as Liddell Hart and M. Howard asserted that a second front could not be opened in 1942 because there was a lack of men and equipment. Yet the allies had (and that was admitted by many bourgeois researchers) both manpower and equipment. In 1942 the armed forces of the USA and Great Britain comprised 10,000,000 officers and men, 70,000 combat planes, 33,000 tanks. The delay in opening a second front was explained not by the lack of men and equipment but by the Imperialist, anti-Soviet policy of the ruling circles in the USA and Britain. They meant to weaken Nazi Germany and her satellites with the help of the Soviet Union and simultaneously to weaken to the maximum the land of socialism in order to preserve their forces and, having invaded Europe by the end of the war, to dictate their terms of peace, to dominate in the postwar world.

Books of a number of American historians written as early as the second half of the 70's pointed out that leading figures in the USA considered the question of opening a second front from the point of view of their "national interests" (in other words, the interests of the American monopolies), which they placed higher than the interests of the coalition. The fact that delay in opening a second front led to a prolongation of the war, to an increase in the losses and ravages of the war in the allied countries did not bother them. For example, M. Stoler in his book "The Politics of the Second Front" writes that the USA elaborated and defended its conception of a second front as a method of winning the war on American and not British or Russian terms. The US military strategy, echoed R. Dallek in his book "Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy 1932-45," boil-

ed down to a quick and cheap destruction of the German and Japanese might. Thus references to lack of manpower and equipment was nothing but a stratagem aimed at an all-round exhausting of the Soviet Union in its struggle against nazi Germany.

But all the calculations of the imperialist circles of the USA and Britain proved wrong. The Soviet people, rallied around its leader—the Communist Party, managed to make full use of the advantages of the socialist system, played the role of the main force in the struggle against fascism and won a world-historic victory.

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BOOK REVIEW: SOVETSKAYA GVARDIYA [THE SOVIET GUARDS]

MOSCOW SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 82 pp 56-57

[Book review by Capt Ye. Seryshev: "Born in Battle"]

[Text]

"Soviet Guards" is the title of a book recently put out by the DOSAAF Publishers. The author, making wide use of archive materials, stories of eye-witnesses and participants of the heroic events gives a fascinating account of the birth of the first Guards units and familiarises the reader with numerous feats of arms of the Soviet fighting men during the Great Patriotic War (1941-45).

A considerable part of the book is devoted to the Soviet Land Forces. The reader will be interested to read about the important role played by these forces and to know that 8,579 of their representatives were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union. It was in the Land Forces that the Soviet Guards were born. Their birthday is celebrated on September 18, when in 1941, in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Command GHQ and by an Order of the USSR People's Commissar of Defence for mass heroism, courage of the personnel and high military skill four infantry divisions: the 100th, the 127th, the 153rd and the 161st,

which distinguished themselves in battles against the enemy, were given the names of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Guards Divisions. These formations fought heroically at Minsk and Smolensk, took part in the counterblow of the forces of the Western and Reserve fronts at Yelnya.

Here are some interesting facts testifying how the fighting men received the news that the title of Guards had been conferred on their formations. In the 2nd Guards Infantry Division, the author says, meetings took place at which the Guardsmen swore to fight the hated enemy and defend the honour and independence of the beloved Motherland sparing neither blood nor even their lives.

Hundreds of applications, sometimes written in pencil on mere scraps of paper, were handed to Party organisations on September 19. "I ask you to admit me to the Party. I will justify in battle the high title of a Communist." Such was the response of the Guardsmen to the Party and the Government, who had appraised so highly their hard soldier's labour.

The ranks of the Soviet Guards went on growing in strenuous and bloody battles near Moscow. On September 21, 1941 the title of Guards was conferred on three

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\* V. Amelchenko, "Soviet Guards," DOSAAF Publishers, Moscow, 1961, 60 pp, (in Russian).



more divisions, and on November 18, for unprecedented courage displayed in defensive battles in the Volokolamsk area the 315th Infantry Division under Major-General I. V. Panfilov was renamed the 8th Guards Division.

The book deals at length with the combat roads of many glorious Guards formations and tells how their servicemen perform their far from easy but honourable duty in the postwar years. On the unit colour of the Guards Taman Division shine the Orders of the Red Banner and Suvorov. In 1946 it was named after M. I. Kalinin, an outstanding Soviet Party worker and statesman. During the Great Patriotic War 33 fighting men of the Taman Division were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. 19,700 officers and men were decorated with Orders and medals.

The Guardsmen from the Taman Division solemnly keep up and multiply glorious combat traditions, constantly improve military skill, maintain strict order and organisation. For successes in combat training and political education the division was awarded the Memorial Banner of the CPSU Central Committee.

Other arms and fighting services of the USSR Armed Forces are also represented in the book. The reader will find very interesting the pages devoted to feats of arms performed by the Soviet tankmen. Here is a case in point.

In the beginning of October 1941, the 4th Tank Brigade commanded by Colonel M. Ye. Katukov, acting as part of the 1st Guards Infantry Corps for several days was containing blows of two enemy tank divisions rushing to Moscow from the south. Making wide use of ambushes, the Soviet tankmen destroyed 133 enemy tanks. This brigade was the first of the tank forces to be named a Guards unit.

Here is a story about one more tank formation. In December 1942 the tank corps under General P. Poluboyarov took part in the grandiose offensive of the Soviet forces on the Don. For valour, staunchness and courage displayed in battle, discipline and organisation, for heroism of the personnel, by Order of the USSR People's Commissar of Defence on January 2, 1943 the Corps was renamed a Guards formation and for particular courage and valour displayed at the inhabited locality of Kantemirovka the formation was named after it.

Twenty thousands of Kantemirovites were awarded Orders and medals, the formation was 18 times commended by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and 31 of its servicemen were honoured with the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government, the author points out, highly appraised combat feats of the artillerymen. Over 1,800 were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. More than 800 unit colours are decorated with combat Orders. Five hundred and fifteen units and formations were awarded the title of Guards units.

The book deals at length with the feat of arms of a battery of rocket launchers under Captain I. A. Flyorov, tells about combat road of one of the first formations of legendary "Katyushas" — the 5th Guards Mortar Division of the General Headquarters reserve. The division received its baptism of fire at the end of January 1943 at Kastornaya and completed its combat road in Berlin.

On December 6, 1941 the 29th the Order of the Red Banner Fighter Aviation Regiment became a Guards Regiment. In two and a half months its pilots shot down 47 enemy planes. Soon Guards Colours were awarded to a number of other regiments.

On January 18, 1942 the 1st Mi-

ne and Torpedo Aviation Regiment, whose pilots delivered bomber blows at the capital of Nazi Germany in August-September 1941, became a Guards unit.

Telling about the glorious Soviet airmen the author points out that during the war the country's Air Force and Air Defence Forces destroyed nearly 55,000 enemy combat planes in the air or on the ground, 2,420 pilots became Heroes of the Soviet Union, while 65 were honoured with this title twice and two pilots — A. Pokryshkin and I. Kozhedub — thrice. Two hundred and eighty eight units and formations were renamed Guards units.

The book describes the ritual of presenting Guards formations and units with Guards colours, informs about confirmation on May 21, 1942 by a Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of a "Guards" badge for servicemen and the introduction of Guards military ranks.

Feats of arms of Soviet seamen also found their brilliant expression in the book. The author testifies that in April 1942, the cruiser "Krasny Kavkaz," the destroyer "Stoiky," the minelayer "Marti" and many other fighting ships entered the ranks of the Soviet Guards. They were followed by many others.

During the war Soviet sailors sank 1,245 enemy fighting ships and motor boats and 1,307 transport ships. More than 500 sailors were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 78 fighting ships and units were honoured with the title of Guards.

An important role in the Battle of Stalingrad was played by the Guards formations and large units. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Guards armies took part in it and after the end of this "battle of the century" seven more armies became Guards armies.

In the offensive operations of 1943-45 the Guards large units and formations acted as a rule in

the decisive directions. The most significant role was played by the Guards tank armies, which were used for exploiting the operational success in the depth of the enemy defences. In a directive to front commanders dated April 18, 1943 GHQ ordered the use of Guards large units and formations in the offensive to break through enemy defences and for decisive counter-blows in the defensive.

The book shows that the rich experience, high military skill, strong military discipline, boundless devotion to the Motherland, mass heroism and organisation of the Guardsmen have always been an example to other servicemen of the Armed Forces.

By the end of the Great Patriotic War there were eleven combined arms and six tank Guards armies in the Soviet Armed Forces, one Guards cavalry-mechanised group, 40 infantry, seven cavalry, 12 tank, nine mechanised and 14 aviation Guards corps, 215 Guards divisions of various arms, dozens of brigades and independent regiments bearing the title of Guards, 18 fighting ships and also many other units of various purpose honoured with this high title.

Having explained that in peacetime the transfer of large units, formations and units to the Guards is not allowed, the author points out that in order to maintain combat traditions when large units, formations, fighting ships and units are disbanded the Guards title can be passed over to other units, formations or ships already existing or newly formed. In conclusion the author tells how the Guardsmen perform their difficult but honourable service in the post-war period and points out that the present generation of Guardsmen living up to the behests of the war heroes, constantly improve their tactical maturity, multiply the glorious traditions and are always ready to stand up for the defence of the beloved Motherland.

## ARMED FORCES

BOOK REVIEW: **ARMIYA--SHKOLA KUL'TURY [THE ARMY IS A SCHOOL OF CULTURE]**

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 82 pp 58-59

[Book review by Lt Col V. Pimenov: "School of Culture"]

[Text]

The saying that the Army is a school of life and education fits to a "T" the role of the USSR Armed Forces in the making of the country's younger generation. It is also an acknowledgement that the army and navy have a definite and time-tested system of educating in military servicemen high will-power qualities, a sense of comradeship and collectivism, skill to overcome difficulties and the ability to adopt an active position in life.

A complex approach is at the basis of this system. By implementing Lenin's behests, Party Congress decisions and Central Committee resolutions on ideological questions, the commanders, political bodies, army and navy Party and YCL organisations achieve unity of ideological, political, moral and military education of the personnel, strive to exert ideological influence on all aspects of the servicemen's military activities and their conditions and mode of life.

An important place in the arsenal of ways and means of exerting influence on the servicemen's consciousness goes also to cultural and educational work. The pamphlet "The Army — a School of Culture" by V. I. Anikovich put

out by the Order of the Badge of Honour DOSAAF Publishers contains a detailed description of the experience accumulated in this respect, organisation peculiarities and methods of cultural and educational work.

The present generation of the armed defenders of the Land of Soviets are familiar with the achievements of Soviet culture. In particular the author quotes these figures: there are almost 140 million TV and radio sets in the USSR and over 74 million home receivers. The majority of families receive not less than three newspapers, and scores of millions subscribe to libraries, whose book stock exceeds 4,000 million copies.

It is naturally hard to imagine today that before the Great October Socialist Revolution almost 80 per cent of the adult population of Russia was illiterate and that over 40 nations and nationalities had no written language of their own. That is how it was. One of the greatest gains of the October Revolution is that the Soviet people today is rightly considered the best educated in the world. At all stages of Soviet society's development the Communist Party and Government showed concern for promoting culture in the armed forces, extending and strengthening the material base for cultural and educational work, training of

\* V. Anikovich, "The Army — a School of Culture," DOSAAF Publishers, 1981, 56 pp. (in Russian).

the necessary cadres and drawing in of scientific, cultural and art personalities into patronage work.

The social, economic and cultural transformations carried out in the country since the war have considerably consolidated the armed forces' social and material base. At the June 1980 meeting of army and navy leading commanders and political personnel, dedicated to questions of raising the Soviet Armed Forces' educational role, Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy General of the Army A. A. Yepishev said: "Concerning the material base for ideological and educational work, thousands of Officers' Houses, Soldiers' and Sailors' Clubs, cinema installations and radio networks are functioning in the armed forces."

The book stocks of the libraries total 120 million volumes. Millions of copies of central, district and local newspapers are sent to the army and navy. The Military Publishing House put out over 2,500 titles of literary works totalling 70 million volumes. Annually over 100 titles of new feature and nearly 250 documentary and popular-science movie films are sent to the armed forces.

Such wide possibilities contribute without doubt to more effective cultural and educational work for the successful implementation of tasks connected with combat training and political education, raising combat readiness of units and ships, strengthening military discipline, order and organisation, bringing culture within the reach of all servicemen and organising interesting and wholesome leisure for them.

The pamphlet describes centres of cultural and educational work: clubs, libraries, Rooms of Combat Glory and Lenin Rooms in military units; Officers' Houses and museums of the formation's history in garrisons. The author notes that the peculiar feature of club work at present is the versatility of its aims and extensive sphere

of activities. Institutions of culture equipped with various technical means, such as stationary cinematographic equipment, radio broadcast installations, sound recording machines, large stocks of books and musical instruments, have wide possibilities for spreading agitation-propaganda and information work, rendering assistance in self-education and mastering skills and conducting various mass cultural events in leisure time.

The role of Lenin Rooms (Lenin Cabins on ships), formed in all companies and equivalent subunits, is great. The name itself, the author says, stresses its lofty purpose and the honourable place it occupies in the entire tenor of military life. The USSR Revolutionary Council decision adopted in 1924 in connection with Red Corners being renamed Lenin Corners (Rooms), stated that they served the purpose of reminding servicemen of the great services rendered by Lenin and engendering in them readiness to give their lives for the defence of the Soviet Republic.

Lenin readings and readings on other socio-political themes, on materials of the 26th CPSU Congress and works of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, evenings and talks on definite subjects and collective reviews of TV programmes are conducted in Lenin Rooms. Other forms of mass work are also practised — get-togethers are organised at which urgent questions, closely linked with the life of the country and the tasks of subunits, are brought up.

The author goes into detail on the experience of the foremost military collectives in studying CPSU congress materials, on the wide use by the clubs' councils and Lenin Rooms of documentary films, socio-political literature, photo illustrations and displays. Readers' conferences, in particular on the subject "V. I. Lenin on the Essence and Meaning of Conscious Military Discipline," oral magazines, cinema festivals and evenings of

questions and answers have a good reputation.

Touching on this experience and analysing the forms and methods of cultural and educational work the author stresses the necessity of constant help rendered to Lenin Rooms by clubs and libraries and to clubs and libraries by Officers' Houses. The central cultural and educational institutions—the Frunze Central Soviet Army House, the USSR Armed Forces Central Museum, the twice Order of the Red Banner Soviet Army Academic Song and Dance Ensemble, the Grekov Studio of Military Artists, the Military Department of the Lenin State Library and the Central Army and Navy Library render diverse methodological and practical help to commanders, political bodies and workers of cultural institutions.

By way of patronage over Soviet servicemen scores of cultural, scientific, literary and art figures take an active part in cultural and educational activities. Commanders and political workers give all-round help to collectives of creative intelligentsia and scientific, cultural and art institutions in conducting mass military work.

Putting into life the CPSU

Central Committee resolution "On Measures to Further Develop Amateur Art Activities" (1978) on the creation of necessary conditions for artistic activities in all clubs and institutions, extensive drawing of the servicemen into amateur groups and artistic circles, regular holding of mass song, dance and brass band music festivities and art competitions, the commanders and political bodies and workers of cultural institutions find ways to further promote all cultural and educational work.

The pamphlet ends by examining some tasks in fulfilment of the CPSU Central Committee demand for further strengthening of the educational role of the Soviet Armed Forces. Its main important task consists in continuing to promote wide propaganda and profound study of the 26th CPSU Congress materials. An important component of all the ideological activities and cultural and educational work of the Soviet Army and Navy is intended to contribute to the rally of servicemen more closely around the CPSU and its Lenin's Central Committee, to heighten vigilance, combat readiness and successful implementation of the socialist emulation obligations.

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## ARMED FORCES

### IMPORTANCE OF STRONG DISCIPLINE STRESSED

Moscow AGITATOR ARMI I FLOTA in Russian No 23, Dec 81 (signed to press 13 Nov 81) pp 12-14

[Article by Lt Gen N. Shevchuk, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Southern Group of Forces: "In the Struggle for Firm Discipline"]

[Text] Organization, efficiency, discipline--these are indispensable requirements both at the center and locally. It is precisely from this standpoint that we must structure the work of all party, state and economic organs.—L. I. Brezhnev (from his speech at the November 1981 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee)

Like all the homeland's defenders, fine men of the Southern Group of Forces completed the training year, the year of the 26th CPSU Congress, with an awareness of their great responsibility for further strengthening the nation's defensive strength and for the fulfillment of their patriotic and international duty. Personnel of the units and subunits in the Southern Group of Forces (YuGV) accepted as a combat order the statement made by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev about Soviet fighting men at the forum of the nation's communists: "The party's Central Committee is confident that they will continue reliably to guard the peaceful, creative labor of the Soviet people"!

The increased responsibility for the fulfillment of military duty during this time of acute class conflict between socialism and capitalism, of aggressive intrigues by the imperialist and Chinese hegemonists, is inseparable from discipline, which is the unshakable foundation and the main factor of our combat readiness, of our combat strength. Concern for firm military discipline is a matter of permanent importance.

Oral political agitation, an important component of ideological work, is of great importance in the multifaceted work performed to further strengthen discipline and to unite the military collectives. Based on vital communication with the men, it provides an opportunity with specific and clear cut facts and examples, familiar and understandable to the men, to show the successes achieved in the building

of communism, to explain party policy, to study the moods of the masses and react promptly to them, to exert focused influence upon the development of competition, to reach each individual and to inspire the men to perform their military work selflessly.

The process of perfecting oral political agitation is more apparent where political organs and party organizations concern themselves daily with its ideological substance, its purposiveness and militancy, where they study the subject matter of the talks and see to it that the leading personnel and every communist take an active part in it. This work is skillfully organized in the Guards Motorized Rifle Volnovakha, twice Red Banner, Order of Suvorov Regiment.

In his daily work Guards Lieutenant Colonel A. Nikolayev, regimental commander, relies upon the party and Komsomol organizations and directs their work toward the successful fulfillment of the combat tasks and the combat and political training plans and toward the strengthening of military discipline.

Many members of the agitation group and oral political agitation activists frequently deliver lectures and reports, talks and political briefings on the subject of discipline, organize and conduct Lenin readings, evening question-and-answer sessions and morning meetings devoted to special subjects. Before meeting with the men, officers V. Balakirev, Ye. Kitayev, M. Makar and V. Vasyutik work painstakingly on the material, select the essential facts, think of ways to relate the subject of the talk to the life and the tasks of the fighting men, and derive conclusions. Structuring their work in accordance with the demands set forth at the 26th CPSU Congress and in the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological, Political and Indoctrinational Work," the communists make it imaginative, vital and interesting and try to avoid cliches and a standardized selection of ready-made formulas.

There is also a great deal to be learned from the work of the agitators in this outstanding unit of our group of forces. Guards Senior Sergeant A. Kalinichenko, Guards Junior Sergeant V. Zakharchenko, Guards Private 1st Class O. Kolomeychuk and many other activists correctly consider the individual approach to each colleague to be their main and most effective work method. They never ignore deficiencies in the training or even the slightest violations of discipline, and they react sharply to instances of relaxed vigilance. Their talks with their comrades are concrete and motivational: "As you fulfill your oath, try to equal the heroes produced by this regiment!", "Never deviate a single step from discipline!" and "Regulations are the law governing our lives"!

The agitators' work must always be at the focus of attention of commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations. They are required constantly to teach the activists mass agitation practices, to assign them specific tasks, to instruct them, to organize an exchange of know-how, to monitor the work of their assistants in the indoctrination of subordinates.

Classes are conducted at schools for agitators in an instructive manner in most military collectives in the group of forces. I will tell you about one such class recently conducted in the unit in which Major A. Rusanov serves as party committee secretary.

The class began with a report by the unit political worker: "The 26th CPSU Congress and the Party Central Committee's Decree 'On Further Improving Ideological, Political and Indoctrinational Work' and the Agitators' Tasks With Respect to Stepping Up the Mass Agitation Work." Many soldiers and sergeants took part in a discussion of the report. Interesting and pithy talks were presented on the following subjects: "The Agitators' Work with Respect to Further Studying the 26th CPSU Congress Materials and Explaining Them to the Fighting Men," "Indoctrinating the Personnel in a Spirit of Loyalty to the Military Oath Is An Important Area of the Agitator's Work" and others.

The activists shared their expertise during a seminar. Private M. Rassadin, as an example, told how he exerts an individual influence upon his colleagues and helps them to increase their political vigilance. Private A. Davydov shared his experience in helping the platoon commander to unite the collective.

The activists were addressed by Major A. Pol'skiy, member of the agitation and propaganda group. The communist, who has a great deal of experience in propaganda work, gave several methodological suggestions to the agitators and told them how the platoon activist should structure his work in daily life.

The seminar participants visited the unit museum, where there was interested discussion about the heroic feats of frontline fighters from the regiment. That same day the agitators heard a lecture entitled "The 26th CPSU Congress on the Leninist Principles Underlying Soviet Foreign Policy." The unit commander then spoke at the seminar. He singled out for comment the work of the best activists and assigned tasks with respect to mobilizing the personnel for the further strengthening of military discipline, the improvement of organization and the uniting of the collectives.

Classes in these schools for agitators are highly beneficial to the activists, but the classes alone are not enough, of course. It is important in good time to provide the oral political agitation activists with the essential literature, technical propaganda means, visual aids and reference material, disseminate their progressive experience, do everything possible to improve the substance of agitator's day in the units and the assemblies of regular and special propagandists, to include in the programs matters pertaining to the improvement of propaganda lecture methods.

Experience has shown that formalism has no place in those collectives in which the commanders, political workers and party organizations carefully and thoroughly study the qualitative aspect of mass agitation work, where the activists are taught to employ all of its forms and methods, where this teaching is accompanied by great demandingness with respect to the organization of this work, where shortcomings in the work are revealed from a position of principle. We must do everything possible to see that such a thorough and thoughtful approach to the job becomes the rule in each unit, in each subunit.

In the matter of raising the effectiveness of oral agitation in the campaign for discipline it would be difficult to overstate the role of the primary party organizations, which are expected to be real centers of day-to-day ideological and

political work, centers for the uniting of the army collectives and for the organization of individual indoctrinational work. We cannot accept as normal the situation in which party organizations rarely study the state of mass agitation work, do not hear reports by the communists/members of the agitation and propaganda collectives and groups, political information officers and agitators on their performance of this important party assignment, do not give them specific assignments and do not provide them with practical assistance.

Experience acquired in our units and subunits convincingly confirms the fact that a comprehensive approach to the organization of oral political agitation is an essential condition of good effectiveness. This calls first of all for its continuous and systematic conduct, for extending its influence to every individual, for ensuring unity of agitation and organizational work and for the ability to conduct the work in such a way that the mass agitation work is an organic, integral part of the entire process of training and indoctrination, conforms most fully to the vital tasks and spiritual requirements of the servicemen and develops the political, work and combat activeness of the broad masses of soldiers.

Indoctrinating the personnel in a spirit of great and conscious discipline is a very important task, a task pertaining to all. The efforts of the propagandists, agitators and political information officers, of all the oral agitation activists, must therefore be constantly directed toward the accomplishment of this task.

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## ARMED FORCES

### LECTURE ON KNOWLEDGE OF ARMS AND ARMAMENTS

Moscow AGITATOR ARMI I FLOTA in Russian No 23, Dec 81 (signed to press 13 Nov 81) pp 18-21

[Article\* by Capt 1st Rank V. Drozdov: "In the Weapon Lies Your Strength"]

[Text] First of all, let us give you a few everyday examples taken from the chronicle of the "Zapad-81" exercise for troops and naval forces.

The radar operators' camps are referred to as permanent alert garrisons. Their main mission is always that of monitoring the air situation. This mission was especially complicated in the exercise. Operators Junior Sergeant E. Sheykis and Private E. Ovakyan detected the "enemy" target at maximum distance, however, and this predetermined the unit personnel's success in repelling the air raid.

The motorized rifle platoon commanded by Lieutenant I. Vanchasovich was forcing a river. As they approached the bank the combat vehicle in which the platoon commander was riding lost a track. While the crews of other combat infantry vehicles covered their comrades with fire, Lieutenant Vanchasovich and Private V. Shveyndorf, operator/mechanic, replaced the track in waist-deep water. The combat infantry vehicle was soon rushing forward again to meet the "enemy."

The excellent crew of the small missile ship commanded by Captain 3d Rank V. Ol'shanskiy performed its assigned mission with honor. As a result of the missilemen's bold attack, the other side "lost" an important combat element. The radar operators also performed with smoothness and precision. They rapidly intercepted the "enemy." The same was true of the engine-room specialists who kept the ship moving and of the missilemen who performed an accurate launching.

The weapons and combat equipment making up the most diverse of systems were employed at rated capacity in the "Zapad-81" exercise. The fighting men serviced them skillfully and competently. They squeezed out of the equipment, so to speak, everything it was capable of giving. And this skillful mastery of the modern combat weapons was one of the most important conditions assuring the success of a large-scale exercise such as "Zapad-81."

\* It is recommended that this article be used for preparing for political classes on the subject "Know and Be Able to Employ the Combat Equipment and Weapons Entrusted to You."



A thorough knowledge of the weapons entrusted to one and its competent employment have always been the gage of a fighting man's preparedness to perform missions in the most difficult situation. We hardly need to demonstrate what great demands are now made of personnel in the Armed Forces at a time when scientific and technological progress is constantly exerting an enormous influence upon all aspects of military affairs. This was expressed very well by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev: "Today's defenders of the Soviet Homeland must master the art of controlling intercontinental missiles and operating supersonic aircraft and nuclear-powered submarines, and must be experts on many other types of extremely complex weapons. Today we need not only men who are simply bold, well-trained and strong and have an accurate eye and a firm hand, but also engineers and mathematicians acquainted with the secrets of electronics and cybernetics. The tasks in this area as well have thus become complex and important and been raised to a higher level."

And these tasks are dictated primarily by the drastic deterioration in the international situation today. Blinded by class hatred for socialism and the cause of peace, the American imperialists and their allies in the aggressive North Atlantic bloc have set out on a path of unrestrained arms race and direct military preparations. While steadfastly and consistently pursuing its peace-loving foreign policy, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government cannot ignore the fact that there are aggressive forces in action in the world, which are interested in increasing international tensions and in the arms race, which are attempting to dictate their will to other peoples. The Party and the State, the 26th CPSU Congress stressed, have never for a single day taken their attention off the matter of strengthening the nation's defensive strength. This forced measure has been and continues to be dictated by the complicated international situation, by the aggressive intrigues of the imperialists and their accomplices, the Chinese hegemonists. Concern for the strengthening of our homeland's economic and defensive strength runs through decisions coming out of the November 1981 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the sixth session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 10th convocation.

The Party and Government are carrying out planned development of the Soviet Armed Forces for purposes of providing the nation with a reliable defense and of promptly repelling an aggressor. In the process, special attention is given to those forces and facilities which to the greatest degree assure the combat strength of the army and navy. The organizational structure and technical provision of the Soviet Armed Forces fully measure up to the modern demands. They have risen to a new and higher level in their development, and never before have they possessed such remarkable equipment, weapons and fighting power as they do today.

The growth of mechanization and automation and the increased combat capabilities of modern weapons have altered the nature of military service, which is requiring ever increasing knowledge, energy, strong will and discipline. All this increases the responsibility of every fighting man with respect to studying and mastering the weapons and equipment and to maintaining them in a constant state of combat readiness.

Beginning with their first days in the service, every soldier and sailor is assigned as his most important task that of conscientiously studying military affairs. This is stated in the military oath and in military regulations. Article 2 of the Internal Service Regulations of the Soviet Armed Forces, for example, states: "A serviceman is required... to understand perfectly and protect the weapons, combat and other equipment entrusted to him...."

And the path to military skill begins with a profound understanding and comprehension of this statement. The study of the weapons and combat equipment in the units and on the ships is performed in strict accordance with the assigned missions and is conducted according to the principle: From the simple to the complicated. Scheduled classes and training sessions are highly important. In these classes the commanders explain the makeup of the weapons, mechanisms and instruments and demonstrate techniques for their use. It is therefore important to grasp all of this very well and not be too lazy to reread a training aid or to repeat a training session until the acquired knowledge and skills are firmly established. It is said with good reason: "There is no ability or skill without thorough training!" and "Training and work lead to glory"!

The foundation of military preparedness lies in the field, air and naval training of the fighting men, that is, in their acquisition of practical skills in using the weapons and the ability to perform under conditions approaching an actual combat situation to the maximum possible degree. These conditions, with a rapid-moving situation, long marches and deployment of the troops in combat orders, day and night, in all kinds of weather, with live firings, the running of tanks, actual bombings and other operations, temper the fighting men far better and more solidly, unite the subunits and teach them to interact and to maneuver better than any other situation.

It is not an easy task to acquire absolute mastery of the combat equipment and weapons, to achieve a high degree of coordination of action. After all, a high level of military skill does not simply happen. There is no need to fear the difficulties, however. The young soldiers and sailors have reliable support in the form of their high level of education, which permits them successfully to master the most complicated of equipment. It would be appropriate at this point to mention the fact that 80 percent of the youth inducted into the Armed Forces today have a secondary or a higher education.

Every military collective has its experienced fighting men and real masters. They are always willing to help—to give advice, to demonstrate and teach. The men need only not to be shy, to turn confidently to them for advice and assistance. After all, everyone in the collective—from the private to the commander—is interested in the overall success, and success is produced of course by the efforts and the skill of every individual.

Today's soldier and sailor ordinarily performs as a member of a team, a shift, a group or a crew. He performs a common task together with the others, and his actions are precisely coordinated and interlinked with the actions of the other

specialists. This interdependency demands great attentiveness, accuracy and correctness of action. What was the result, for example, during the last war, if one of the soldiers committed a blunder while conducting fire? It was too bad, of course, if a rifle bullet, a round from a submachine gun or a cannon shell failed to hit the target. Such an error by one soldier, however, did not have a decisive influence upon the course of the battle. The situation is different today. It is enough for a single fighting man to commit a slight error or perform sluggishly--to launch a missile a few seconds late or to fail to start up a certain system--and an enemy aircraft or missile will be missed, one possibly carrying a nuclear charge. And the enemy will accomplish its foul deed, the consequences of which are difficult even to imagine.

Many years of service and combat experience have confirmed the fact that the fighting man who has trained himself in discipline, who has accustomed himself to respect and fulfill the demands set forth in regulations, orders and instructions on the servicing and employment of the equipment, achieves success more rapidly in the combat training. These fighting men enjoy honor and respect in the military collectives and receive awards from command. In the units and on the ships which fulfill absolutely all the steps prescribed by manuals and instructions for servicing and caring for the combat equipment, the combat equipment and weapons are always in a state of readiness and there are no breakdowns or malfunctions in exercises. These collectives ordinarily do considerably better than the previously established for operation of the materiel, which saves a great deal of state funds.

Like any other job, the study of the combat equipment and weapons demands initiative, creative quest and the activation of new, unutilized reserves. We have already pointed out the fact that the complex combat equipment is making heightened demands of the military technical training of the fighting men, of their thinking ability and the scope of their knowledge. The commanders and political workers constantly concern themselves with improving the combat training methods and its quality: A large volume of knowledge now has to be mastered in shorter service periods. The soldiers and sergeants, sailors and petty officers themselves can do a great deal toward the accomplishment of this important task, however. There is some area in which each of them can apply his efforts: improving the training plant or becoming involved in the rationalization project. Classrooms outfitted with simple technical devices, as an example, are a great aid to the squad or platoon commander, who can at any time check to see how thoroughly the trainees have mastered the material covered.

Active participation in socialist competition is highly important for each soldier and sailor. It is the patriotic duty of fighting men persistently to strive to fulfill their accepted commitments, to achieve the high rating of expert in the combat and political training, of rated specialists. Actively participating in socialist competition the fighting man not only improves his combat skill but also instills in himself such remarkable qualities as comradely mutual assistance and aid and the ability to live for the collective interests and affairs.

The frontline soldiers understood very well the need constantly to perfect their technical know-how and to improve their military technological sophistication. During the Great Patriotic War Soviet fighting men had to master new weapons and combat equipment right on the battlefield. In the process great importance was also attached to studying the enemy's weapons. Without a thorough knowledge of the weapons and without the ability skillfully to employ them, it would have been impossible to achieve victory over such a powerful and treacherous enemy as the German fascist army.

The present generation of fighting men are carrying on and adding to the glorious tradition of the frontline fighters—that of training for battle, for victory. At the training fields and grounds, in the tools and the classrooms, on long ocean cruises and lengthy flights, army and navy fighting men are persistently mastering the art of conducting modern combat, diligently studying the weapons and combat equipment, honorably and conscientiously fulfilling their duty. Inspired by the concern demonstrated by the Party and the Government for increasing the strength of the Armed Forces, they are achieving new successes in their combat and political training and are increasing the vigilance and the combat readiness of the units and ships.

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AIRFIELD CAMOUFLAGE DURING GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 82 pp 26-27

[Article by Col Ye. Simakov: "Camouflage of Air Force Operations"]

[Text]

**This article describes the experience of the Soviet Air Force in camouflage when preparing for and conducting offensive operations in the Great Patriotic War (1941-45).**

**T**HE AIR FORCE Command always attached great importance to operational camouflage, which is a factor in achieving surprise and misleading the enemy as to the time, character and scope of intended operations. For this purpose measures were taken to conceal operating airfields and organise dummy ones and also to guard concentration of aviation units and formations against enemy observation.

Different methods were used to conceal operating airfields. The most common method comprised a whole set of measures to camouflage runways, taxiways, installations, parking areas and aircraft. Airfields were camouflaged by means of false bomb-craters, ditches, gullies and strips of land with the grass mown to simulate roads. Conifer branches were used to simulate bushes. Marshy terrain simulation with the use of moss, slag and grass was often employed to conceal airfields. If an airfield was situated near a forest, the aircraft were parked so as to be hidden by the trees. Small patches of land cleared among bushes were also frequently used for parking aircraft which were camouflaged with branches.

Motor vehicles were usually kept dispersed on the airfield. After servicing of the aircraft, the vehicles immediately took cover in camouflaged parking places.

To simulate a deserted airfield, which was often the case, the airfield was strewn with smashed and burnt out vehicles, false craters and structures resembling wrecked buildings. In summer time hay-stacks or stooks were also used to camouflage airfields.



If aircraft were parked on open ground (as, for instance, in a steppe), they were camouflaged with horizontal screens or with mats of straw, corn- or sunflower-stalks.

Camouflage discipline was also strictly observed in the air, especially when returning to the home airfield. To divert the enemy reconnaissance aircraft on this part of the flight, different methods were used. They included flying over the check point of performing flying manoeuvres such as a circle along the route or a loop. Landing on dummy airfields was also simulated.

When preparing for and during offensive operations three methods were used to camouflage air bases.

The first method consisted in providing dummy airfields where previously operating ones had been located. For instance, during the Crimean offensive (April-May 1944) the camouflage service of the 8th Air Army simulated concentration of this formation on its former home airfields (southeast of Kherson) in order to conceal its redeployment.

The second method consisted in concealing operating airfields by organising dummy ones in areas of likely enemy flying routes. Dummy airfields were prepared unobserved and dummy aircraft installed during the night.


Camouflage yielded good results if high activity was skillfully simulated on dummy airfields. Thus, during the Belgorod-Kharkov operation (summer 1943) the 208th Night Bomber Regiment carried out its sorties from an airfield complex at Zimovnoye. Naturally, the enemy sent reconnaissance aircraft there. To mislead the enemy several night operating pads and two dummy night airfields (in Starikovo and Ivitsa) were organised within 5 km from the operating airfield. Soviet aircraft returning to their home airfield were usually followed by enemy reconnaissance planes. But deceived by the "high activity" on the dummy airfields, the enemy failed to detect where the Soviet aircraft landed. In the period from June 5 to July 17 the enemy aviation performed numerous raids on the dummy airfield in Starikovo and not a single bomb was dropped on the operating airfield.

If the enemy persistently pounded a dummy airfield continually for two days, activity on it ceased and another dummy airfield began to function. Thanks to their alternate operation and a well thought-out use of the operating pads and also due to strict observance of camouflage rules the enemy failed to reduce the high combat activity of the Soviet night bombers.

The third method of camouflaging air bases was to simulate concentration of air force formations. Thus, in July 1943, when the Nazi aviation resumed its activity on the Kursk Bulge, the Soviet Command decided to draw off part of this force. For this purpose a dummy airfield complex was organised south of this area, near Voroshilovgrad. It included four airfields whose functioning was simulated round the clock. The airfield complex was organised quickly and unobserved. In two days it was provided with nearly 200 dummy aircraft, overhead screens and camouflage nets. Subsequently the enemy subjected

this airfield complex to repeated air raids.

During the Kiev operation (November 1943) skilful camouflage measures were taken to conceal the airfield of the 2nd Air Army. To ensure the safety of the fighter and attack aviation (whose airfields were mostly known to the enemy), a network of dummy airfields was organised (see Sketch). These dummies were located so as to be vi-



sible to enemy aircraft flying over the Dnieper. The trick was a success. After detecting these "airfields," the enemy delivered air strikes at them for several weeks. As a result of skilful deception measures the Soviet aviation lost only three aircraft on the ground.

Dummy airfields were built by camouflage crews, which followed the advancing forces. The dummy airfields would begin to function before the operating airfields were ready for use. If air force units were not redeployed, the forward camouflage crews proceeded to build another dummy airfield 8-12 km from the previously organised one. When the situation at the front was stable, camouflage crews would organise 2 or 3 dummy airfields.

Camouflage crews were used both in the areas where aviation was to deploy and on the lines of advance where only dummy airfields were to be built.

When preparing for an offensive the Soviet Command usually simulated aviation concentrations in different areas. This helped to mislead the enemy as to the true areas of aviation deployment and the direction of the main Soviet blow.

Airfields intended for use were prepared in advance but kept unoccupied. The equipment was kept at rear airfields a considerable distance from the front line. Dummy airfields were provided with a small number of dummy aircraft, the flights of single planes simulating their activity. Several days before the beginning of an offensive, more dummy aircraft were delivered to the dummy airfields, and carelessly camouflaged. The enemy naturally detected these changes. Simultaneously, air force units were quickly transferred to the forward operating airfields in order to fulfil combat missions set to them by the

Command.

In this connection the activity of the 2nd Air Army logistical system during the Lvov-Sandomir operation (summer 1944) may be of interest. At that time this army numbered more than 3,000 aircraft. One of its main tasks was to build enough airfields to provide concealed aviation dispersion. Considerable attention was paid to a concealed redeployment and location of newly arrived units and formations. First they were brought to rear airfields located at a distance of 100-150 km from the front line. A day before the Soviet offensive began, some units were transferred to forward airfields.

In order to conceal from the enemy the high combat activity of the army logistical system and aviation deployment, all camouflage rules were strictly observed and a network of dummy airfields was set up. The air army combat area was provided with 33 dummy airfields and parking pads for separate fighter flights. The planes were used to simulate covering of a dummy airfield complex.

Great work was done to camouflage operating airfields. The airfields deserted as a result of air force redeployment were reequipped with dummy aircraft, motor vehicles and AA guns.

All these measures to mislead the enemy proved highly effective.

A specific feature of the Soviet aviation deployment during the war was its maximum dispersion on operating airfields. This found its reflection in the camouflage measures taken. Camouflage methods were constantly improved. In the initial period of the war attention was concentrated on preserving the materiel by thorough camouflage and keeping only a limited number of aircraft on operating airfields. The method of covering the latter by dummy airfields was widely used. Then, in the period of extensive offensive operations, the main task was to conceal aviation redeployment from the enemy by using rear airfields and organising dummy airfield complexes. Finally, the effort was aimed at achieving surprise by misleading the enemy as to the direction of the main attack. To carry out this task large aviation forces had to be used.

The camouflage experience gained by the Soviet Air Force still forms the basis for its further improvement.

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## GROUND FORCES

### COMMUNICATIONS DURING EXERCISES DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 82 pp 23-24

[Article by Lt Col I. Golub: "Communications on the March"]

[Text]

**T**O CONTROL a battalion on a long-distance march, use is made as a rule of message-carrying agencies, sound and visual signals. This ensures secrecy of movement.

Radio communication facilities should be always ready to receive and transmit information. Communication with the senior commander, his deputies and the headquarters is organised via the corresponding nets, and also through the commandant's radio net established by the higher HQ along the route of movement. Inside the battalion two VHF radio nets are set up; the first to switch into these nets are the radios of the battalion commander and of the commanders of motorised infantry companies, the mortar battery and attached subunits. Then the radios of the deputy commander for technical service and of all the armoured personnel carriers are switched in. Subunits, except for logistics, have their own VHF radio nets.

Communications on the march should be organised with regard for the mission to be accomplished by the motorised infantry battalion during the march and take into account conditions in which it will be performed. It is advisable to consider the organisation and maintenance of communication on the march by stages: at the beginning of movement, at day (night) rest places and on the last stage.

If the battalion is moving at a great distance from the area of forthcoming actions, wire communication on the march is organised by means and forces of the higher headquarters. Usually it is installed up to the start point, and sometimes even the traffic control points. Instructions and reports are delivered during this time by message-carrying agencies (APCs, messengers). Coopera-


tion and warning signals are given, both during movement and at halts, by means of flags, lights and the like.

If communication is organized in this manner, the control problems are solved as follows. To ensure secrecy, the passage of control points by the battalion is reported to the higher headquarters over a field cable line laid to the start point. Should it fail, information is transmitted via the commandant's net.

Besides, other data transmission methods are used. For instance, on passing the start point or a control point the battalion commander may leave a written report containing the subunit designation, time of passage and condition of the column. The officer of the traffic control post transmits this report to the higher HQ using signal means which ensure maximum communication security.

In some cases traffic control officers identify the column themselves by the numbers and conventional signs on the vehicles and transmit the required data to destination. Sometimes the executive officer or the battalion commander personally reports the necessary information on the column movement from the control post. A less common practice is for the battalion commander's radio, when approaching the control post, to switch into the commandant's net to transmit a prearranged signal.

The senior commander or the higher headquarters receive information either through the commandant's net or directly from traffic control posts. Control and warning signals, orders and instructions are in turn transmitted to the battalion via the senior commander's radio net using the





commandant's service agencies or are delivered by messengers.

During movement only radio sets of subunit commanders and of the technical trail chief are allowed to switch (in stand-by mode) into the battalion commander's radio net. To avoid premature discharge of storage batteries of armoured personnel carriers, their radio sets are switched off at halts and portable radios are used for communication.

To achieve maximum secrecy, the number of transmitters is reduced to a minimum. Thus to warn subunits of an enemy air attack the second net is used. All the messages are transmitted in the form of prearranged signals, often without using call signs. Only the radios of the battalion commander and of the reconnaissance patrol commander are allowed to transmit.

At rest places the communications service ensures transmission of information on the time of arrival and the condition of the column to the higher headquarters, and information exchange within the battalion. For this purpose duty radios are detailed at the command post, operating in the net of the senior commander and in one of the battalion nets.

At rest places wire communication is established from the battalion commander and the HQ to the motorised infantry companies, the mortar battery and attached subunits. To save cable and reduce the time required for its laying and recovery, communication with several subscribers may be carried out through one line. Sometimes this line is laid to the security outposts.

At this stage message-carrying agencies (e. g. APCs detailed by the battalion executive officer) are also used for control purposes. They shuttle between assigned points or on a circular route. If subunits are located not far from one another, they send foot messengers.

On the last stage of the march, when approaching the battle area, the route formation should be reorganised taking into consideration a possible meeting with the enemy. The attached tanks and artillery are distributed throughout the column. To ensure control of all elements of the combat formation upon initiation of the meeting engagement, radios of artillery and engineer subunit commanders are switched into the battalion commander's net. An independent net is established for tanks.

Communication with the advance party, which usually consists of a reinforced motorised infantry company, is maintained through the radio net of the battalion commander. At this stage radio com-

munication security requirements do not become less rigid, as the enemy, using special equipment mounted on planes and helicopters, may locate operating VHF radio sets at a distance of up to 200 km.

In these conditions transmissions of signals in the Bn commander's net is allowed only in exceptional cases (to warn the troops of an air attack or when meeting the enemy). Transmission is allowed only for radios of the advance party, reconnaissance agencies and the battalion commander.

Once the meeting engagement has started, the battalion commander will be forced to transmit instructions to the advance party commander over the radio. The latter will also have to use a radio set to send reports.

With the initiation of the meeting engagement, demands for information exchange among co-operating subunits sharply increase. A motorised infantry battalion, for example, will have to maintain communication with its neighbours, second echelon subunits, AD weapons and reserve. The same applies to companies and the artillery and tanks which support them. Besides, in case of a dismounted combat the platoon and company commanders will have to control their APCs by radio.

In all cases a method of mutual switching into the radio net is mainly used. How quickly communication will be established depends on the readiness of the available means for operation on several frequencies. As soon as the personnel dismount, the commanders switch over to portable radios.

We have discussed various types of communication used in a motorised infantry battalion for control purposes on a long-distance march. As on the march the operation of radio for transmission must be reduced to a minimum, signalmen must strictly observe radio silence and commanders should be able to control their subunits using messengers and signals only.

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## AIR DEFENSE FORCES

### INTERVIEW WITH MAJ GEN N. SECHKIN ON RADAR PERSONNEL TRAINING

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 82 pp 18-20

[Interview with Maj Gen N. Sechkin, chief of staff of the Radar Troops of the Air Defense Forces, under the rubric "April 11--Air Defense Forces Day": "Combat Training Standard of Radio-Radar Troops"]

[Text]

The Soviet Union's air frontiers stretch over 60,000 kilometres. In any weather, by day and by night, servicemen of the Air Defence Forces perform combat alert duty. This service is difficult and strenuous and the responsibility of every private, sergeant, officer and general is very great. They are meeting their professional holiday — Day of the Air Defence Forces — with excellent results in combat training and political education. Our editorial office requested Major-General N. Sechkin, Chief of Staff of the Radio-Radar Troops of the Air Defence Forces, to answer some questions.

The Air Defence Forces belong to one of the most complicated and technically most equipped fighting services in the Soviet Armed Forces. What particular role do the Radio-Radar Troops play?

It is known that these troops are the first to detect enemy air attack weapons. The effective use of antiaircraft missiles and fighter interceptors depends on the distance at which the men will be able to determine the targets' characteristics and with what precision, and on their ability to foresee the likely actions of the opposing side and to supply exhaustive radar information. Therefore, commanders, staffs and political bodies of the Radio-Radar Troops constantly see to it that the personnel perform their service vigilantly and are ready for competent and energetic actions in any tactical situation.

Most important in this connection is radar

crews' ability to make the maximum use of the equipment's combat potentialities. This depends first of all on the professional training standard of specialists, particularly subunit commanders, and radar chiefs and operators.

In the process of combat training (during lessons, drills and particularly during tactical exercises) radar operators acquire sufficient skill in manoeuvring the positions for efficiently fulfilling the missions of a modern air defence battle. To enhance the effectiveness of the training, commanders have made a practice of using methods of mathematical modelling with the aid of computers. Accurate calculations of radar visibility zones enhance operativeness, quality and authenticity in assessing the positions from the point of view of complete utilisation of the equipment's combat capabilities.

The radar being a crew weapon, the final result depends on skilful and prompt actions by each serviceman, and team-work of the shift, crew and the whole subunit. These qualities enable radar operators, radiotelegraph operators and other specialists of the Radio-Radar Troops to carry out the assigned missions successfully during combat alert duties and tactical exercises. Their high proficiency helps them to define exactly the calculated time of the targets' entrance into the radar detection zone at maximum range, to bring the equipment into action in time, to search for a probable enemy's air attack weapons, and supply information to combat subunits.

Abundant supply of equipment is one of the constituents of the combat potential. What demands are made in this connection on servicemen's training!

One such requirement is deep knowledge of the equipment and its maintenance in constant combat readiness. Even an experienced operator will fail to carry out an assigned mission if the equipment is maladjusted and shows a performance below its capabilities. Knowledge of the equipment's potentialities goes a long way to improve specialists' tactical maturity and combat proficiency.

An experienced operator knows, for instance, that a sudden dimming of target blips is a result of a sharp change in the flight altitude of the air attack weapons. The evolutions of the blip on the screen help him to disclose the composition of the target in good time, foresee its heading and altitude manoeuvres, etc. The operator must also be familiar with the accidents of the terrain, the combat capabilities of different types of aircraft and their tactics, and so on.

Detection of low-altitude targets at super-long ranges and tracking them is an important moment in the operators' activity.

Another complicated task is to determine the exact height of low-altitude targets. In the event of a multiple target, in particular, the difficulty consists in that the operator does not know what part of the target is seen on the indicator screen. Knowledge of shape of blips of targets flying at different ranges comes to the operator's aid.

Training highly qualified specialists has its specifics. Will you please tell us about some of them?

In perfecting servicemen's proficiency commanders place very stringent demands on them and teach them various "secrets" of work to develop firm skills. This is a very complicated and time-consuming process, and there are many reasons for that. For example, when the operator has to present data on the target it is very difficult for him to follow its movement, for he is obliged to shift his attention to other targets. He makes each report on one and the same target after it has already covered a certain distance. During this time its parameters and the nature of its actions are likely to change.

These and other factors hard to explain tell on the final results of data processing, on identification of targets' routes, determination of target characteristics, etc. Therefore, commanders and radar chiefs organise special training. Systematic training is the most important condition for developing radar crews' team-work so that they can carry out combat missions in any air or ground situation.

To improve servicemen's combat training standards and to turn out high class specialists a sound training base has been set up in companies and battalions of the Soviet Radio-Radar Troops. It includes the most up-to-date highly effective radio-electronic equipment. An important role in perfecting radar operators' practical skills is played by simulation equipment, which allows situations closely approximating real combat to be created on the indicator screens. That is why acquiring firm skills in handling simulators and trainers is of primordial significance for the men's training.

To intensify the process of radar operators' instruction, the workplaces of the main specialists are provided with remote indicators. The personnel's actions are registered by tape recorders and cameras. The decoding of these materials and analysis of the servicemen's actions to meet the requirements of combat training standards are performed automatically. All these measures enhance the effectiveness of combat training.

Recently battle control algorithms have been extensively used for officers' and praporshchiks'



training. This trend will be developed in every possible way, for experience has shown that different subunit commanders and radar chiefs act differently in the same tactical situation until they have assimilated the optimal sequence of actions in carrying out the assigned mission. This sequence forms the basis of algorithms which improve the quality of work and reduce the period of combat training.

Team-work and efficiency, however, are not only a result of specialists' profound knowledge of the equipment and methods of countering jamming or their understanding of the combat mission; they also presuppose the ability to make a timely and correct assessment of the enemy. This assessment should be specified clearly; in particular, it should contain precise information on the forces and combat formation of the expected enemy. Radar chiefs and operators must know precisely in what part of the radar visibility zone the targets are most likely to manoeuvre, and also the probability of jamming, its type and intensity. This is indispensable in order to take timely countermeasures. In short, radar operator must be able to forecast the tactics of the opposing side.

The Air Defence Forces are in constant combat readiness, which is largely due to combat alert duty. Could you please say a few words about this?

Combat alert duty is equivalent to performing a combat mission. Servicemen of the Air Defence Forces entering on duty are entrusted with the most up-to-date and formidable weapon — anti-aircraft missiles, supersonic fighter interceptors, radar equipment and automatic control systems.

The servicemen on duty must be ready to fulfil at a moment's notice their specific task and the mission as a whole irrespective of the situation. A strict procedure of preparing for and assuming combat alert duty has been established in the Air Defence Forces of the USSR. Subunits are allowed performing a tour of duty only after the personnel's training standard and their readiness to carry out such a responsible task have been checked and after they have received the necessary weapons and equipment. A subunit assumes combat alert duty on the commander's order: "Enter on duty to guard the air frontiers of our Motherland — the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." Assuming combat alert duty begins with the following ceremonious ritual. With combat crews lined up in perfect formation, the unit colours are presented. This is followed by a solemn march, after which the servicemen proceed to their action stations. Strict compliance with the ritual instils in the men deep patriotic sentiments, pride at being part of the Air Defence Forces, and high personal responsibility for protecting our Motherland's air frontiers.

READERS' QUESTIONS ON ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY ANSWERED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 82 p 25

[Unattributed article under the rubric "Modern Battle: Questions and Answers": "AA Artillery Fire Positions"]

[Text]

In books and in practice one often comes across such terms concerning the use of AA weapons as primary, alternate, temporary and dummy positions. What is the purpose and role of these positions in combat activity of the AA weapons?

To fight the air enemy AA subunits take up fire positions from which they carry out their main combat missions. For example, in order to cover a Mts Inf Bn on the line of launching an attack, an AA battery repulses attacks of enemy planes and combat helicopters, not allowing the enemy to deliver blows at the AA subunits or carry out air reconnaissance. Such a position is the main one.

Modern combat demands high activity, manoeuvrability and rapid actions of AA weapons. Therefore, a stationary, slow activity on the part of AA subunits today is inadmissible and outdated. The reason for this is not only that the covered troops are carrying out highly manoeuvrable combat actions and the AA weapons must constantly be in combat formations but also that the enemy strives to destroy the AA subunits in the first place. Therefore, the AA subunits should frequently change their positions, manoeuvre and mislead the enemy as to their location. At the same time they must carry out their main mission — to

cover the forces, firing at the air enemy and preventing his air attacks.

Proceeding from this, AA subunits, besides primary fire positions are assigned other fire positions such as: alternate, temporary and, sometimes even dummy positions.

Alternate fire positions are always chosen simultaneously with primary positions. They are destined to be taken up in case of forced and sometimes a prearranged abandoning of the latter. If, for example, the enemy opens up intensive fire at the main fire position with the aim of destroying the battery, the latter takes up an alternate fire position.

Prearranged abandonment of fire positions is often dictated by a frequently changing situation in which AA subunits' fire from an alternate position would be more effective than from the main one.

The move to an alternate fire position in any case is allowed only with permission of the senior commander or in accordance with previously received instructions.

Temporary fire positions, as a rule in a defensive battle, are intended for carrying out separate fire missions during a short time. The purpose of actions from these

positions is to transfer the fire zone to the approaches to the protected troops, to increase the covered area by a frequent change of temporary fire positions after each firing (roving AA subunits) and also to mislead the enemy as to the true position of a group of AA weapons.

Although each of the positions listed has its own purpose, the requirements in their choice are the same. A position must secure a convenient position of guns, organization of the terrain with engineer works and camouflage, all-round fire, location behind natural antitank obstacles or behind all-arms subunits provided with antitank weapons. From these positions there must be good observation of the selected reference points and the positions must have convenient access roads securing rapid occupation and evacuation.

Dummy fire positions are organized to mislead the enemy as to the true location of a fire position. Their organization and camouflage are carried out in such a way that revealing features are noticeable. Dummy positions not only divert enemy attention from a true position but force him to make mistakes, and (in case of an error), require a considerable expenditure of his men and equipment. Such was frequently the case during the local wars in Indo-China and in the Middle East, particularly in the struggle of the Vietnamese patriots against the American aggressors. When the enemy had detected the main fire position, the Vietnamese AA men moved to an alternate one, organizing the abandoned position as a dummy one. The enemy delivered a powerful blow at the dummy position and, redeploying, returned but ran into effective surprise fire of the patriots and sustained heavy losses.

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## AIR DEFENSE FORCES

### RADAR TRACKING EXERCISE DESCRIBED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Feb 82 p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Nemets: "And Again Outstanding"]

[Text] Screened by active jamming, the "enemy" aircraft swooped down on the target planned for the attack. The lead targets entered the zone of the surface-to-air missile [SAM] battalion at different altitudes. Battalion commander Lt Col A. Kalashnikov gave the command for opening fire at that very second. The first target was picked up for tracking precisely and conditionally brought under fire. The specialists also acted confidently in "destroying" the following targets.

A break appeared in the combat work but it was brief. Officer Kalashnikov realized that the "enemy" had managed to reconnoiter the battalion location and unquestionably would try to deliver a strike against it. Therefore he decided to change the position.

"Close down the equipment!" came the command.

Officers, warrant officers, privates and NCO's began closing down the missile system. Every second counted and everyone realized well that future success largely was being decided right now.

Then the battalion was on the march. It began to get dark and the road became barely discernible, but privates Ya. Tukleris, V. Nadtochiy and the other driver-mechanics of the combat vehicles were composed and attentive. The subunit arrived at its destination by the designated time.

Occupying the deployment area from the move, the missilemen began to prepare the equipment for action. The subordinates of surveillance radar chief Sr Lt S. Maksimov and launcher commander Lt A. Shakirov functioned with particular initiative and bettered the established norm. This was very apropos as targets appeared in the zone of radar coverage before it was assumed they would. Hardly had the surveillance radar antenna made a revolution when a pale blip flashed near the very edge of the screen. Data went to Lt Col Kalashnikov without delay. An experienced specialist and repeated participant of operational training firings at the range, he estimated the situation rapidly and accurately.

"Pick up target for tracking!"

At this command the operators joined in the combat work. As always the target was locked on and tracking begun in a minimum time period.

The battalion operator crew is the best in the unit. For three years it has not given up leadership in socialist competition and has held the title of outstanding. During the latest operational training firings at the range the missilemen had to fire against a high-speed radio-controlled target. They hit it accurately, thus putting down one more victory to the subunit's combat record.

Enriched by the range experience, the missilemen perfected their professional expertise with even greater diligence. The crew's socialist pledges made in honor of the 60th anniversary of the USSR's foundation contains the following words: "Accomplish all operational training missions with high quality and hit targets with the first missile in field firings." To keep their word the operators take advantage of every opportunity for drills and practice their actions until they are automatic. There never has been an instance where they have made a mistake or let down the subunit in tactical problems or exercises. And today privates S. Pinchuk, S. Purgin and their comrades perform their missions with teamwork and high quality.

Soon comes the turn of the launcher specialists to act. They also did not let the others down. The missile strike was accurate.

The targets were "destroyed" at the far line, but the test did not end with this for battalion personnel. The air "enemy" made one more attempt to penetrate to the defended installation. He appeared from a direction from which there was apparently no basis to expect him, but even this tactical move, calculated for surprise, was not crowned with success. The missilemen were vigilant and managed to disrupt the air "enemy's" plan promptly.

The personnel left the position in a good mood. They had passed one more difficult test. And again they had earned the high grade of "outstanding."

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## AIR DEFENSE FORCES

### MISSILE GUIDANCE EXERCISE DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Feb 82 p 2

[Article by Lt Col N. Shishkin: "Missile Guidance Specialist"]

[Text] The finale of operational training firings came in a routine, laconic report: "Target destroyed!" But the intense work of many specialists was required in order for the traces of the high-speed radio-controlled target and the missile to intersect somewhere high in the sky.

Missile equipment is recognized as a crew-served weapon. Its effectiveness depends on everyone. Nevertheless, among the many specialists comprising the missile system's combat team, the missile guidance officer is given an especially responsible role. It is his actions which crown the entire collective's efforts.

Capt Aleksandr Andreyevich Nol'd is a missile guidance officer by calling. He fully has everything required for this complex military specialty: vast knowledge, expertise, a strong will, self-control, and the ability not to lose presence of mind in a critical situation.

The path to proficiency as a missile guidance officer was not easy or quick. Nol'd completed military school as a specialist in launcher equipment. He requested the North when assignments were being made. His very first independent steps attracted the attention of the subunit commander. He knew his job, was persistent and was industrious. Soon a trip to the range was at hand, but then the technician of one of the systems got sick. Who was to replace him? The commander rested his choice on Lt Nol'd. He believed that the young officer would be able to prepare both the people and the equipment for the upcoming test in the time remaining and he was not wrong.

After the return from the range the battalion commander invited Nol'd in to see him.

"We soon will have a vacant position of missile guidance officer. We are nominating you," he said. "You have the necessary requirements but you will have to work a great deal, a very great deal."

From early childhood Aleksandr Nol'd had learned the truth that work is the chief element in a person's life. One has to give his all to work without reservation. And he also was accustomed to take a responsible attitude toward

everything. If the interests of the matter require it, his own desires had to be moved to the background. That is what he was taught by his father, a logging foreman. He taught by example, by his own attitude toward work.

Aleksandr Nol'd was 14 years old when his father died. It was difficult to live as the family was large. His older brother Nikolay entered military school and all male concerns at home fell on Aleksandr's shoulders. He had to help his mother and think about the younger children. During vacation he worked in the forest industry and would bustle about the forestry in the evenings.

The difficult childhood tempered his character. This came in very handy in military school, which he entered after completing secondary school.

...The subunit commander's proposal to master the specialty of missile guidance officer was perceived by Nol'd as trust. He learned everything to the fine points. He never allowed a light attitude toward any job--that was one of the facets of his character.

Some time later the lieutenant reported to the commander: "I'm ready to take the test for authorization for independent work." An authoritative commission was assembled. It checked the officer's training in all parameters, as they say: theory, practical actions, the ability to analyze situations which arise suddenly and to make decisions... All commission members arrived at a unanimous conclusion: He was ready for independent work.

Later came drills, tactical exercises and range firings. Each time the missile guidance officer's actions received the same grade--"outstanding."

Once the commander said of Nol'd:

"He is a specialist of a high class."

I believe there is not a grain of exaggeration in this opinion. I have had more than one occasion to observe the officer's actions under very difficult conditions. I don't recall an instance where he was betrayed by confidence and self-control or where certain circumstances forced him to make a mistake. This is real expertise. It was manifested especially vividly during the latest range firings. It happened as follows.

An unprecedented downpour and thunderstorm began just before the missile launches. Cables were flooded. The water made its way to the huts in a matter of minutes. And then in addition the range instructors began to introduce malfunctions to the gear for training purposes.

In short, the people were in for it but they did not let anyone down. The example of Capt Nol'd was greatly felt here. Imperturbable and calm, he confidently directed the team of operators.

The target had a small reflective surface and was picked up by the operators immediately after its take-off. After climbing it went into a steep dive,

simultaneously changing its course heading. It is extremely difficult to track such a target. The high angular speed of its movement has an effect. The operators had difficulty keeping it in the crosshairs of the sights.

The target came closer and closer. The launch was at hand. The equipment was switched to the automatic tracking mode to ensure maximum accuracy of guidance. But what was this? The blip on the screen began to fade and might disappear at any moment. There no longer was time to switch to another mode and reacquire the target. There was one solution: Launch immediately. Without awaiting a command the missile guidance officer pressed the button.

Later when the target had been destroyed this situation was analyzed more than once or twice and the conclusion was that Capt Nol'd had found the only correct decision. He was not afraid to assume the full measure of responsibility for its consequences. This is also a part of Capt Aleksandr Nol'd's character as a party member and master of missile fire.

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## AIR DEFENSE FORCES

### NIGHT TRAINING EXERCISE DESCRIBED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Feb 82 p 1

[Article by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col V. Shchekotov, Red Banner Ural Military District: "Effectiveness and Quality are Paramount: At Night by Daytime Norms"]

[Text] The column of vehicles wound its way for a long while in the darkness among the birch groves and finally halted in one of them. The snowstorm seemingly let up here, with only the wind heard in the treetops and a fine, biting snow falling without ceasing. The battalion commander pointed out the locations of activities to the subunits and updated the operational training mission. After dispersing rapidly the missilemen began work.

Appearing first at one and then another training station, the battalion commander monitored his subordinates' actions, assessed results of norm fulfillment and compared the combat schooling of competing batteries. Later he named the winners when he summarized results. This was done at the end of every phase of the practice.

All personnel worked with diligence and initiative. Best results in the first phase were achieved by personnel of the launcher battery commanded by Capt N. Gurin. This subunit was first to occupy the firing position and report readiness for a launch, confirming in fact its ability to act at night under daytime norms.

Engines of the combat vehicles again began to strain and signals of running lights lit up in the snowstorm. In a little while the column entered an area of magnetic anomaly. Here is where the missilemen were given a new order to occupy firing positions. Col L. Karapetyan, deputy district commander for missile troops and artillery who was present at the practice, made the situation even more complex by giving the following narrative: "The artillery gyrocompass has gone out in the first launcher battery."

Deploying from the march at an unprepared position always is a difficult matter. But now it required the missilemen to have special precision, accuracy, teamwork, mutual understanding and the coordination of all specialists.

Capt Gurin is a first class specialist, but even he had great difficulty finding the correct decision in the situation at hand. After consulting with the battalion chief of staff, he reported to the senior commander that there was



one solution in this situation--to transmit the bearing to aiming point to the combat vehicles from the artillery gyrocompass of the adjacent launcher battery. Instructions immediately followed and right after that an exchange of appropriate information. The battery performed the mission successfully.

Resourcefulness and initiative also were shown by officers of the first launcher battery in the expedient method they proposed for monitoring the laying of the combat vehicles. Two luminous aiming points (of different colors) are put out at the position at night. The layers refer to these points and report computed data for both points as well. The battery commander compares data received from the layers with those he calculated himself and thus determines laying accuracy. This practically precludes mistakes and simplifies to a maximum the work of monitoring the precision with which the operation is performed.

In summing up the night problem, Col Karapetyan noted the high professional training of the officers and all battalion personnel, and their ability to keep from getting confused in a difficult situation, to make the most expedient decisions and to act at night under daytime norms.

Officers of the launcher battery commanded by Capt Gurin attained greatest success in competition. All of them are specialists of a high class and they work long and productively to improve their professional expertise and that of their subordinates.

An individual approach to people is correctly regarded here as the basis of success. The following example is indicative. When the battery received new replacements last time Capt Gurin studied each person's capabilities and capacities and fixed his attention on a young soldier, Pvt I. Korostylev. He saw in him the qualities needed by a computer operator: He was attentive and understood mathematics well. The officer chatted with the private, told him about the features of the specialty and showed him the sequence in performing elements of combat work. He emphasized that success of the entire team of launcher personnel depends largely on the computer's actions. Korostylev was eager: "I wish to become a computer operator."

The battery commander kept a constant eye on the private and gave him special assignments. Experienced computer operator Sgt A. Shekhovtsev shared his experience with Korostylev. In a half-year the young soldier took the test for third class, then for second class.

The battery commander encouraged his subordinate's zeal and helped him improve in the theory and practice of combat work. Then toward the end of his first year of service Korostylev not only became a first class specialist, but also drew up his own data computation table for a missile launch. The table permits a considerable saving of time in the computer's work and at the same time increases the accuracy of calculations. Now other computers operators are studying Pfc Korostylev's experience.

The experience of the best specialists and soldiers who distinguished themselves in problems always is studied and generalized in the subunit while it



is still fresh. And so this time as well, on their return from the range battalion party activists Capt N. Alifanov, Maj A. Vasil'yev and others arranged for an exchange of experience of those who distinguished themselves in the night practice. Captains N. Gurin and V. Levin, Sr WO D. Vasil'yev and Pfc I. Korostylev spoke to their colleagues. They told how they take account of the features of working under conditions of limited visibility and how they work on themselves to keep within daytime norms at night.

The missile battalion made high pledges in honor of the 60th anniversary of the USSR's foundation. The personnel are full of resolve to fulfill them and raise the subunit's combat readiness even higher.

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## SURFACE VESSEL COMBAT TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 4, Apr 82 pp 21-22

[Article by Eng Capt 1st Rank M. Tsiporukha, under the rubric "Combat Training": "Combat Exercises on a Ship"]

### [Text]

Each combat exercise on a ship imitates to a certain degree a definite stage of a modern naval action. In the course of such exercises commanders' and complements' proficiency is improved and skills in using weapons and equipment in conditions closely approximating real combat are acquired. Therefore, such exercises in the Soviet Navy are rightly called the highest form of sailors' combat training.

Depending on the purpose, combat exercises on a ship are divided into preparatory, test, control and competitive exercises. The first are aimed at preparing ships' complements for fulfilling test exercises, the ship's commander being generally in charge. The complements work up such questions as preparatory gun firing, ships' sailing with a list or trim, righting of ships, running with the rudder jammed or with only one main engine functioning, receiving and preparing mines for laying, etc.

The degree of the ship's preparedness for carrying out specific missions is judged by test exercises, which are generally directed by the formation commander or his deputy, and complete the separate stages of complements' training. Therefore, they are a real test of the personnel's combat maturity. In the course of these exercises the men perform

test gun and torpedo firing, lay and sweep mines, solve such complicated and important tasks as searching for and attacking a submarine singly, a surface ship fighting enemy ships, etc.

Control combat exercises are organised by the order of superior chiefs or inspectors to check ships' combat readiness.

And, finally, competitive exercises are carried out for the purpose of revealing the most combat-ready ships and the winners in socialist emulation for achieving the best results in studies, and also for stimulating the men's striving to improve the quality of combat training. As during the previous exercises, ships perform firing, search for and attack of submarines, mine laying and other combat missions. The best ships, determined from the results of firing and attacks, are awarded prizes of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy.

As we see, combat exercises on ships proceed with the use of weapons and with combat manoeuvring against an instructive tactical background with obligatory designation of "enemy" actions. It is natural, of course, that combat exercises with the actual use of weapons require a most thorough preparation, with commanders concentrating their attention on working up coopera-

tion between the ship's main control room and the command posts of all departments.

While preparing for such an exercise, the commander of a destroyer worked out the assignment, discussed the plan for fulfilling it with the executive officer and department commanders, checked the preliminary calculations and appointed umpires.

Before the beginning of the exercise he briefed the ship's officers, elucidated the purpose of the exercise and ordered that each seaman, starshine and mitchman be explained his particular task. The personnel were to practise methods of controlling a damaged ship with the use of the equipment designed for the purpose. Equally important was to determine the feasibility of using the ship's weapons and equipment in conditions of considerable list.

For example, firing the major calibre gun at a preset rate with the normal trim of the ship and with a constant list to one side are quite different things. In the latter conditions both the ship's equip-

ment and the crews' actions were to be tested.

During the briefing the commander reminded the men of the necessity to check all portholes, doors and hatches for tightness, and fire-fighting and water discharge equipment for serviceability.

All officers, mitchmans and starshines were checked for knowledge of the rules of using weapons and equipment with the ship listing.

The ship's commander and his assistants discussed in detail the safety precautions to be taken and also the umpires' preparedness. To ensure safety during the exercise, a number of relevant measures were envisaged. For instance, the load on the main boiler was to be reduced by using additionally a standby boiler, and supervision of the work of the outside water pumps was to be intensified.

On the day of the exercise the commander arrived at the main control room and demanded that reports be made on the readiness and checking of the intercom system. An alarm signal was then sounded on the ship, and the main



control room radio announced: "Begin combat exercise to right the ship."

Fuel and water were transferred to make a list. The commander watched closely the precision of execution of all steps envisaged by the plan, and the timeliness of reports on the fulfillment of narratives.

After heeling the ship to a predetermined number of degrees the personnel had training in servicing guns, air defence submachine guns, torpedo launchers, radar and sonar equipment.

Then the ship's CO listened to and approved the engineering department commander's suggestions on righting the ship. Transfer of fuel began and counterflooding of compartments was simulated.

At the critique organized for the officers the ship's commander summed up the results of the exercise, assessed the degree to which the training tasks had been solved, and the readiness of each department and service.

Then the commanders of departments and chiefs of services held a detailed critique with their subordinates.

The destroyer's complement also prepared for and carried out combat exercises to work up sailing with a damaged or jammed rudder and controlling the ship by means of the main engines. It is noteworthy that the commander had himself studied most thoroughly the specifics of operation of the entire machinery ensuring the ship's way and manoeuvre, which enabled him to get to the very bottom of the complement's actions. Jointly with the commander of the engineering department he supervised the preparations of duty watches who were to carry out the main control room's orders to change the rpm of the propellers.

During training cruises watches and boiler room crews constantly worked up their actions at quick changes of ahead running or during reversing. Competently combining theoretical knowledge with practi-

cal training enabled the ship's complement to carry out the exercise on a high professional level.

The commander's painstaking work to train and educate the subordinates yielded fruit: the destroyer fulfilled successfully the combat training plan to become one of the best ships in the formation.

The necessity of the personnel's constant training by combat exercises is borne out by the experience of the Great Patriotic War. In December 1941, for example, naval specialists in many countries were astonished to learn that the Black Sea Fleet cruiser "Krasny Kavkaz" had boldly broken through to the nazi-occupied port of Feodosiya and landed troops on the very pier under a squall of enemy fire. In the night of January 3, 1942 the cruiser headed again for Feodosiya taking aboard an army antiaircraft artillery battalion with all its weapons and equipment. When unloading of the material and landing of the men were nearing completion, the ship was attacked by enemy aircraft. Three bombs exploded near the ship. Water quickly filled the stern. The commander had to withdraw the ship from the pier. The draught increased sharply, and the stern almost completely disappeared under water.

The enemy planes reappeared. The ship's antiaircraft gunners managed to repulse all the attacks, but one bomb nevertheless burst near the cruiser's side. The screw was torn off a propeller shaft, the second turbine set was damaged, the rudders were inoperative, the list reached four degrees, and trim by the stern was a whole four metres. But in spite of all this the complement spared no pains to ensure the ship's survivability.

Going at slow speed with only two turbines operating, the ship reached Tuapsi defying the stormy sea. After the repairs in Poti it set out on a combat cruise again in the autumn of 1942. This would not have been possible, of course, without the complement's excellent

combat training standards, staunchness and self-possession, which helped them to emerge victorious from the duel with the enemy.

The personnel of the Soviet Navy have thoroughly studied the experience of the Great Patriotic War, and continue to perfect their combat skills. Combat exercises and drills on ships contribute to this in no small degree.

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## NAVAL FORCES

### NAVAL TRAINING ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED

Data on Admiral A. Mikhaylovskiy

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jan 82 p 2

[Article by Adm A. Mikhaylovskiy: "What You Sow Since Youth: - Lieutenant Years"]

[Text] The first postwar graduation in the Higher Naval School imeni M. V. Frunze took place in 1947. Lieutenant A. Mikhaylovskiy received a diploma with distinction and, in accordance with his own desire, he took off to serve in the Pacific Fleet where he travelled the path from navigator to the commander of a ship.

Service in the Arctic became a special page in the life of Arkadiy Petrovich Mikhaylovskiy. Commanding a nuclear submarine, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for mastery of new equipment and cruises beneath the Arctic ice. Without separation from service on ships, he defended his candidate and doctoral dissertations.

Admiral A. Mikhaylovskiy commanded the Red Banner Leningrad Naval Base for several years. He was recently appointed commander of the Red Banner Northern Fleet. His reflections on the officer's duty, which KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is publishing today, are directed toward young officers.

One day, a retired vice admiral whom I have known well for a long time and is extremely well respected appealed to me. He reported that his grandson is completing the Higher Naval School imeni M. V. Frunze and requested my assistance in assigning the lieutenant to Leningrad or Kronshtadt, motivating his request by the fact that here, near his home, it allegedly would be easier for the young officer to get on his feet and set a correct course in service.

"In addition," the veteran added after a pause, "his grandmother and mother are not well and would like to see the youth nearby."

In talking with me, the retired vice admiral continuously diverted his glance to the side. It was evident that it was difficult for this seaman gray with age to make his request.

I listened to the veteran and thought of my own service. I thought that it is unsuitable for a young officer to begin his naval officer's service, sacrificing his long-range goals and high ideals for the sake of relative conveniences of life under family guardianship in a large city. But why did he want to graduate from a naval school? Why long for a probationary training period namely on a ship? Why make it appear before your fellow-classmen and instructors that you love the navy and not only the naval uniform, that you love combat ships and not only the medal "For a Long Cruise" which was obtained on a navigational cruise on a training ship?

In selecting his place of service, in a certain sense a lieutenant places his order for an officer's destiny. After 10 years the schoolfellows will have behind them the experience of independent maturing, ship's tempering, realized professional recognition, clear growth prospects.... What will be had by a young officer who, with his first step, set his course for a calm harbor?

I have not had the occasion to hear complaints on their destiny from people who were able to overcome tremendous difficulties and accomplish an exploit. It is namely those who desired to protect themselves against all difficulties, various adversities, and dangers who complain about their destiny after a number of years. With age a person reaps what he sowed since youth.

Each lieutenant links with his place of service the hopes, the majority of which, apparently, are the same for graduates of the postwar generations. Here we also have the craving to land in a certain fleet, on a ship of favorite design, the striving for equipment studied within the walls of the school, and finally, a specific post.... The noncoincidence of reality with the dream in even one of these parameters (naturally, far from all of them have been mentioned) suffices for a lieutenant no longer to be absolutely satisfied with his assignment, without reservations. And there is nothing special in this because it is natural for a person to dream and to achieve the fulfillment of his dream.

Life has proven: best of all for a matter and for service is a situation where a young officer begins to accomplish his duties with enthusiasm. In other words, when the place of service, including his post, satisfies his inclinations. This means that the officer's very attitude toward his place of service is not his personal matter alone. From this we also have the typical position of the appointing instances--to satisfy the demands of the lieutenants on their first assignment to a post as soon as such a possibility exists.

It also happens that the objective personnel situation does not permit satisfying the desire of a graduate of the school. Then the law of necessity goes into effect, the law of military duty which the lieutenant obeys because he is an officer. He is required to serve where he has been ordered.

Movement from one post to another and changing from one place of service to another are regular phenomena in an officer's life. Of course, the first assignment is perceived most emotionally. But subsequently, each movement or rejection of it sometimes causes strong emotional experiences. I will present one example.

A lieutenant (I will call him Nesterov) arrived in a submarine force--an intelligent, energetic officer. He mastered the equipment in short times, headed

a group confidently, and rather quickly passed the tests for independent control of a department, and after a while he was appointed its commander. At age 25 he became a captain-lieutenant. Soon Nesterov was offered the post of ship's executive officer with the prospect of further development along the command line. The officer refused the post, simply counting on a vacant place as a flag specialist. However, the vacancy was filled by another officer--an academy graduate. By this time the post of ship's executive officer was also filled.

In this situation, Nesterov was literally transformed. He resented everyone except himself. He began to perform his duties carelessly, which also entailed a change in evaluating his service prospects. And this was a correct re-evaluation.

Yes, naval service objectively requires that an officer be light on his feet and, in the good meaning of the word, have the inclination to change places. Another of its requirements is just as objective: to be in readiness constantly to learn and re-learn.

Let us take a rather difficult situation. One military occupation specialty was recorded in a diploma, but because of circumstances the officer was offered a post which, as they say, did not conform to his category. When the mastery of the first nuclear submarines was begun, the fleet required specialists such as no school had as yet trained. Hundreds of officers and warrant officers [michman] undertook training and the mastery of absolutely new technical disciplines and fundamentally new weapons systems and equipment.

I recall the commander of the engineering department, Engineer-Captain 3d Rank N. Bisovka, with whom I had the occasion to travel many thousands of miles in the depths of the ocean and beneath the ice. He came to our nuclear missile carrier having service experience only on diesel boats. He studied the main power plant in compressed times and thereby accomplished a qualitative jump in his qualifications. Mastery of the new and unknown gave him true joy, and this joy lightened the tremendous service loads which lay on the shoulders of the engineering officer. His enthusiasm became a moral reference point for the young officers, and it is not by chance that many of them, then still lieutenants, now occupy high posts and are working fruitfully in science.

Yes, the mastery of new equipment then was accomplished thoroughly and quickly, when an officer was proud of the confidence shown in him and when efforts to raise his qualifications and to expand his engineering range brought him creative satisfaction. It is namely this approach to matters which service requires of the school graduate. If, contrary to expectations, he is offered a post which is not quite in accordance with his duty category.

They may object to me--good, as soon as the assignment is connected with a promising, latest line in the development of the fleet. Here the efforts are not regretted, here prestige aspects are strong. And how about expending efforts on the mastery of some already well-worn system? He studied it today, and tomorrow they took it from the inventory.

I will try to rest upon two examples to answer such an objection. From time to time, in responding to the successes in the development of one field of technology, public



opinion hurries, as they say, to give some traditional specialties up as a bad job, referring them to the category of those which have just about died off. Let us say that when gas turbine engines appeared, some spoke like this about engineers for steam power plants; when missile weapon systems appeared, similar doubts arose among some concerning artillery officers.

Just what has time shown? Namely steam power plants, but in combination with nuclear reactors, became the basis of the power engineering of the latest ships. Highly automatic fast-firing artillery systems confidently took their place alongside with and supplementing missile weapons. The prestige of the specialties connected with the servicing of this equipment was completely restored in the opinion of former sceptics by the objective course of life.

The knowledge, skills, and experience that an officer obtains when operating any equipment always comes in handy for him in service--often on a qualitatively new level. Therefore, the economy of efforts which some young officers justify by their reluctance to become accustomed to an "unpromising" specialty does not withstand criticism at all. Even more. As it seems to me, simple adherence to narrow specialization is absolutely impermissible for the officer who is dreaming of growth along the command line.

The key figure in the fleet is the commander of the ship. During his lieutenant years, any commander of a ship was a navigator or miner, missileman or a specialist in the electronics department. Unquestionably, the knowledge of any initial specialty may also come in handy for him on the flying bridge. But if in his command qualities an officer remains one-sidedly oriented in his interests, he simply will prove to be a weak commander. Versatility and breadth of training, universality and diversity of education, complex competence--this is the credo of the best ship commanders.

Now is the time to again recall Captain-Lieutenant Nesterov. I said that the command correctly reviewed its attitude toward this officer. I believe that now this statement has become more understandable. Nesterov turned the question of his place of service and his post into a subjective question of caprice. Not receiving the desired assignment, he decided to show that it was the interests of the ship which suffer from this first of all. But if an officer takes the occasion for a this-minute attitude with such ease and sacrifices his service duty in the name of caprice, how can he be entrusted with a more responsible and important post? The person showed himself in a situation of choice--and he was also given the appropriate evaluation.

I think that the reader will understand correctly why I do not give the officer's true name. He is still to perform much service. Perhaps, he will realize his error.

It is an old truth: the place does not color the man, but the man colors the place. It is not the place of service by itself which brings an officer satisfaction, but our own attitude toward the given place of service. Such an attitude is formed under the influence of a great number of components, first of all purposeful indoctrination in which the efforts of the commander, and the party organization, and the officers' wardroom should be united. But nevertheless, in my opinion the decisive role should belong to the officer himself.



Well, and what about our graduate of whom we spoke at first? In this case, true far-sightedness was displayed by youth. I again met his grandfather recently. He said that his grandson, having become a lieutenant, received an assignment to the Pacific Fleet in accordance with his own desire.

There was no shadow of distress noticeable in the words of the vice admiral. It was evident from everything that he is proud of the decision which the lieutenant made independently. And I was filled with even more respect for the veteran.

#### Air-Cushioned Vessel Simulator Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Dec 81 p 1

[Article by Sr Lt O. Odnokolenko, Baltic Fleet: "Ships' Commanders Drill"]

[Text] Captain-Lieutenant B. Makov pressed the button--and the sea grew calm. But if the officer had wanted, he could "stir" it up to sea state 9. Today, Makov's power over the elements is virtually unlimited. He lights up the sun and the stars, lays a curtain of fog over sea and land....

Of course, none of this actually occurs. The leader of the drill, Captain-Lieutenant Makov, skillfully simulated difficult weather conditions using a special simulator which was created to train commanders of air-cushion landing vessels. It is sufficient for him to press the appropriate buttons or keys on the simulator control console and television screens installed in the ports of the "running bridge" create the complete illusion of being at sea for the officer being trained. And the ship's motion is almost real and the noise of real ship's engines which have been recorded on tape burst out of the dynamic loudspeaker.

About 40 different standard situations which might arise on a sea cruise or in a training battle are contained in the simulator's program. And some of them are being worked out today by a group of ships' commanders who have arrived for drills. In the new training year which has begun, numerous important departures for sea and difficult training combat missions await each of them. The foundation for future successes is laid now to a great degree, in the course of base training. Therefore, the officers are well-collected to the maximum and are striving to operate on the drill with maximum return.

Here Captain-Lieutenant A. Otkidych puts on the interphone headset and sits in the commander's chair. The test begins. First, the officer must execute a special situation on divergence from an oncoming ship. He performs the necessary calculations quickly and commands confidently. The leader of the drill complicates the situation with a "strong cross wind." Captain-Lieutenant Otkidych continues to operate irreproachably. The maneuver is executed competently.

Right here the officer lands in another situation. Now his mission is to bring the ship to the shore on an air cushion. And again the situation is complicated to the maximum. Special situations concerning the failure of individual ship's mechanisms are added to the special situations about difficult weather conditions. But Otkidych again overcomes all difficulties skillfully.

Captain-Lieutenant A. Otkidych is one of the leading ship commanders. Well, and in addition, perhaps he is acquainted with this simulator more than the other commanders. In fact, at one time Captain-Lieutenant K. Mikhaylov, Warrant Officer [nichman] Ya. Timchishin, and other seamen who prepared programs for the simulator took namely his experience when modelling various training combat situations. It was namely Otkidych who, having worked out thoroughly and to perfection the order for commanders' actions in accordance with one or another special situation, then "re-told" it to the memory. The simulator verifies the ability of the officers in accordance with these models which have now been encoded on punched tapes.

Completing the drill, Captain-Lieutenant Makov reads the data from all instruments and begins the critique. He points out to the officers the errors which have been committed and used reserves and he advises them concerning what they should pay special attention to in subsequent training. He has the capability to corroborate each of his conclusions and each of his evaluations with specific objective indicators. This ensures the depth of analysis. Thanks to such an objective critique the effectiveness of the drill is increased even more.

The officers leave the training room. And in several minutes a new group arrives to replace them.

The leader of the next drill presses the button and the sea again lashes in the ports of the "running bridge...."

#### ASW Ship Commander on Honor

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Dec 81 p 2

[Article by Capt 3d Rank A. Kovshar', commander of large ASW ship "Skoryy": "The Crew's Honor"]

[Text] I had the occasion to begin my officer's service on the missile cruiser "Groznyy." At that time, its fame thundered far beyond the limits of the Black Sea Fleet. The crew of the "Groznyy" had won the Naval Prize for missile training six times in a row.

I remember that then someone spread the rumor that, he said, it seemed that the best seamen are specially selected for the cruiser. What can be said about this? Of course, in our crew there were very many excellent seamen, but none of them were selected here. Some special, uplifting moral atmosphere which reigned on the ship made them like this. If you almost made a mistake, you immediately hear: "They don't serve on the 'Groznyy' like that." You work conscientiously--and praise follows: "That's the way they do it on the 'Groznyy!'"

More and more often I caught myself trying to evaluate my subordinates by the same strict yardstick with which I was evaluated. And really, could I operate otherwise if standing before my eyes all the time was the example of demanding people who were devoted to their ship--the commander of the "Groznyy" at that time, Captain 1st Rank V. Korneychuk, crew veterans officers Ye. Masayev and V. Brunshteyn, Warrant Officer [nichman] R. Ostrovskiy, and others?

The crew's honor.... General concern for it, each seaman's responsibility for the ship's good name and behind which stands the deeply realized sense of military duty for the motherland--this is what rallies the people first of all and directs them toward high goals. Military achievements, and firm military discipline, and a healthy moral climate begin with this.

Here it will be appropriate to stress that the traditions of naval honor and valor have deep patriotic roots. We recall the heroic brig "Merkuriy" which defended its honor in an unequal battle with the enemy, we recall the legendary cruiser "Varyag" which perished but did not lower its flag before the enemy.... My father, a front-line fighter, often told me how the seamen loved and were proud of their ships in the years of the Great Patriotic War. "We are from the 'Tashkent,'" "We are from the 'Krasnyy Kryn,'" "We are from the "Soobrazitel'nyy...." This sounded like a pledge not to disgrace the name of the ship under any circumstances.

The contemporary ships on which we, the heirs of the frontline fighters, are serving inherited the names which are covered with glory. We have also inherited the traditions to carry the honor of its crew highly. It is therefore important that each young seaman stores in his heart and lives with the aspiration to inscribe his own brilliant line in the chronicle of glory of his own military collective.

When I was appointed the commander of the large ASW [antisubmarine warfare] ship "Skoryy," I set just such a task for myself. I wanted that "We are from the 'Skoryy'" be sounded with pride from the mouths of my subordinates, too, and that the same atmosphere reigns on it as I had the occasion to encounter in my lieutenant years on the "Groznyy."

I admit that at first it seemed that it was easy to achieve this. I thought as follows--it is necessary to talk a little more with people about the honor of our crew and to be a little more strictly demanding toward those who do not value it and things would get on well by themselves. However, with time the understanding came together with command experience--nothing happens by itself.

The following fact is recalled. I invited Lieutenant S. Pronkin to my cabin dozens of times, and dozens of times I tried to understand why a young officer who had completed school successfully and has good service prospects is indifferent toward his obligations and violates discipline. How many times did I tell Pronkin that he disgraces the honor of the ship by his behavior. Alas, all without results. The lieutenant accomplished misdemeanor after misdemeanor. And in the end, it was necessary for him to part with the "Skoryy" and later--with the fleet.

I did a great deal of thinking after that: why did this occur? As I now understand, it was not a matter of some chronic defect which Pronkin had. It was something else. It so happened that at the very start of his service the lieutenant changed several collectives. He didn't take root anywhere. In our crew, unfortunately, he also remained a stranger. True, we zealously undertook his reindoctrination but we did not reflect on the fact that words about the ship's good name remained an empty sound for Pronkin. For it was all the same to him--he would serve on the "Skoryy" or someplace else.



In order to indoctrinate a person for whom the honor of the crew would be dear, it is first necessary to instill in him love for his ship. And this is a delicate and difficult matter. Nothing is attained by rushing or, what is more, alone. Here the commander cannot get by without the support of the officers and warrant officers, the party and Komsomol organizations, and without all those who, as is usually said, comprise the backbone of the collective.

I was personally lucky in this regard: there were people to lean upon on the "Skoryy." Captain 3d Rank A. Baltyev, Captain-Lieutenant Ye. Khalaychev, Warrant Officers A. Tomilin, N. Grankov, and V. Anfilov, and others who worry about their crew did much to rally it and instill in the men high personal responsibility for its successes.

Thanks to them to a great extent, we now have matters so organized that now both first-year seamen as well as young warrant officers and lieutenants who are graduates of the schools begin service on the "Skoryy" by becoming acquainted with its rich traditions. It is mandatory that the seamen be told also about the history of the ships which formerly bore the name "Skoryy" and what our modern ASW ship is. By the way, it also has many glorious deeds to its credit. The "Skoryy" participated in supporting the combat sweeping in the Gulf of Suez, its seamen represented the motherland with honor in various countries during friendly visits.... All this, we believe, must be known without fail by those who now serve in the crew.

It has been correctly noted: a feeling of love for a ship is engendered in a seaman when he begins to feel at home on it and when everything becomes well known and dear to him here.

We say: the serviceman is responsible for the honor of the collective. But you see, the collective should also be responsible for each of its members. These things are inseparable.

One day, a misdemeanor by Warrant Officer V. Zaginayko was considered at a session of the warrant officer comradesly court of honor of the "Skoryy." Those present spoke one after the other and cast words of reproach in his direction, but everyone felt: they did not get through to the guilty one. But then Warrant Officer V. Kotenko spoke. He also condemned the behavior of his fellow serviceman, but he also spoke of something else--about insufficient attention to him on the part of the warrant officer collective, about the fact that neither he himself nor the other comrades did everything to keep Zaginayko from the misdemeanor and help him. Warrant Officers Tomilin and Sechkov also spoke self-critically.... Such a turn of events which was so unexpected for Zaginayko made a tremendous impression in him. It was namely after this that he, in my opinion, finally understood that his error was not only a personal matter and he felt himself to be a small part of the collective. The warrant officer promised to straighten out. He kept his word.

In my opinion, it is not enough simply to condemn and punish the seaman who is at fault. It is also necessary to evaluate his behavior from positions of naval honor. But in punishing someone for some offense, let us say, do we always think about how deeply the punishment touches the spiritual chords of the serviceman? What does he feel--will he simply take the punishment into consideration, or will he be vexed and perhaps, even bear a grudge? Or else does he feel remorse and shame

before his comrades whom he let down nevertheless? Obviously, only in this case can it be said that the indoctrinational measure attained its goal.

It is the same with commendations. It is one thing simply to cite one who has distinguished himself, and another to instill in him the striving to work even more fruitfully to the glory of the collective and inspire pride at the same time.

At one time, Seaman Yu. Markov caused us a lot of trouble. His complex, touchy nature pushed him into rash deeds many times. One day, one of the officers proposed: and what if we try entrusting Markov with some responsible matter and give him the opportunity to show what he can do? It was said--and done. He was entrusted to put the rigging in order. The seaman coped with the matter in a short time. Moreover, he prepared original manuals for naval practice. Unquestionably, Markov deserved commendation. But we decided not to limit ourselves to this alone. What Markov had done was specially shown to the crew. We noted that the manuals will be used on the ship for many years.

After this, you wouldn't recognize the seaman. It was no longer necessary artificially to create conditions so that he could confirm himself in the collective. He confirmed himself by deeds, initiative, and the striving to leave a good mark in the crew. With time, the "difficult" seaman became the irreplaceable commander of the boatswain section. And when the time arrived for his release to the reserve, he could not leave the "Skoryy" and wrote a report with the request that he remain on the ship as a warrant officer. Markov is now the senior boatswain of the "Skoryy."

As is usually said, the very backbone of the crew, on which the commander relies in all matters, is made up of just such patriots of their ship. Of course, this backbone is not formed in one day, but by the years.

It seems to me that it is time for some personnel workers to transfer young officers from place to place when vacancies open up in some places. It is more useful for the matter if the officer spends at least the first few duty steps in the same collective. Perhaps the service growth of some will not be so swift but, in return, we will not have the problems that we had with Pronkin.

We on the "Skoryy" are trying where possible not to look for candidates elsewhere for various vacancies. Thus, the executive officer, Captain-Lieutenant Ye. Khalaychev, has been serving on the ship since his lieutenant years. The same can be said of the majority of subunit commanders. The stability and solidarity of the crew is also furthered by the fact that we fill the warrant officer posts primarily through those who spent their active service on the "Skoryy."

The ship is not simply a place for the seaman to serve. It should become his home and fortress, his dream and hope, his fate and love. When this is so, it can be said that the naval officer, warrant officer, or simply the seaman has arrived. When this is so, the honor of the crew will be just as dear to the seaman as his personal honor.



## Rescue of Egyptian Vessel

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jan 82 p 1

[Article by Capt 3d Rank M. Vygovskiy: "In A Raging Sea"]

[Text] An alarming report reached the ocean minesweeper "Rulevoy" of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet which was accomplishing training combat missions on a long cruise: an Egyptian schooner with four crew members is in distress 50 miles from shore on a crossing to Beirut. The engine broke down on it during a storm. A strong wind tore the sail. Deprived of movement and control, the schooner drifted in the raging sea. The schooner's master, Habel Kirim, requested assistance.

The minesweeper rushed toward the ship in distress at maximum speed. At about 0300 hours the signalmen discovered the schooner which was rocking so that the masts literally lay on the waves. Under these conditions, it proved difficult to approach the schooner to take it in tow. One careless movement and the little wooden ship will be scattered in slivers from the blow against the ship's steel side. A high level of skill was demonstrated by the commander of the minesweeper, officer A. Ishinov who, by means of a skillful maneuver, managed to bring the ship to the vessel in distress from the leeward side. The entire crew operated smoothly and clearly. Petty Officer 1st Class V. Gol'tsov and Senior Seamen V. Pavel'chuk and V. Dmitriyev demonstrated bravery and high skill.

After several attempts they finally succeeded in winding up the tow lines, and the ocean minesweeper with the schooner in distress set its course for Beirut....

## Winter Missile Patrol Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Jan 82 p 1

[Article by Capt 3d Rank V. Morgun: "The First Miles"]

[Text] Reporting to the division commander concerning the results of the guided missile boat's first departure for sea in the new training year, Captain-Lieutenant G. Luk'yanenko returned to the ship unhurriedly. Snow crunched beneath his feet, frost nipped pleasantly at his cheeks, but the officer noted none of this. The crew had received a favorable grade for the accomplishment of the training combat mission, but a feeling of dissatisfaction did not leave the commander. Not all elements of the crew proved to be coordinated and reliable, and weak spots were felt in some of them, and this pained Captain-Lieutenant Luk'yanenko.

The boat stayed at the base for some time, and the commander did much to prepare the crew for a cruise under conditions of a wintery sea. It would appear that everything had been considered. The daily plans were drawn up with such a trend that it seemed as if the boat should be on the point of unmooring. But the very first mile covered on the cruise disclosed a number of omissions in the crew's training.

Take the helmsmen-signalmen. When standing underway watch, Senior Seaman P. Bakhtin and other seamen were late with their reports and sometimes held the course in-exactly. And when the commander ordered transmitting semaphore to an adjacent ship,

young seaman Drozdov completely lost control and did not meet the standard. And this in a comparatively simple situation where the sea was calm and snow gusts did not fly onto the boat as often happens.

Or take the performance of duty by the special details. While still standing at anchor Seaman A. Dumkovskiy, being on duty, committed a number of serious blunders. It turns out that the senior of the mechanics' crew, Warrant Officer [michman] N. Kazymin, had clearly not trained his subordinate sufficiently in this regard.

There also were other shortcomings. The words of the division commander: "Of course, your sailing did not proceed smoothly, and we assigned a grade with an allowance for certain circumstances. I hope that you are drawing the proper conclusions from the lesson of the first miles"--stuck in his head.

With consideration of all this, Captain-Lieutenant Luk'yanenko also decided to conduct a critique of the first cruise with the officers and warrant officers, preparing for it with all thoroughness and thinking over a specific plan of action for each disclosed reproof. But he first wanted to hear what his subordinates will say about the lessons of the first miles of the new training year and what measures they propose to smooth out the crew.

Those who attended reported in turn about the results of the cruise, expressed sensible suggestions, and it was felt that they, just as the commander, are suffering for the shortcomings. And this caused joy: if the subordinates are not satisfied with what has been attained, it means that the crew is on the correct path and the state of affairs on the ship will improve.

After the conference, as if continuing the critique mentally, the commander drew the conclusion that more attention should be devoted to the engineer department. The seamen of the leading specialties, as is customarily said, for example the sonarmen and radar operators, drilled regularly in the training room while at anchor. Therefore, on the first cruise they operated as if there had been no interruption in the cruises. But really, don't those who ensure the movement of the ship belong among the leaders?

Considering the lessons of the first departure for sea, Captain-Lieutenant Luk'yanenko is persistently and energetically adopting measures today for the elimination of shortcomings and for knocking a crew together. Together with his executive officer, Senior Lieutenant N. Lastochkin, he is trying to check and "grind in" the joints in the cooperation of the subunits. He constantly helps the young commander of the engineer department to acquire confidence. The damage-control party is improving its ability from drill to drill. In the new training year the entire crew of the "Kronshtadtskiy Komsomolets" is persistently struggling for the title of leader with persistent and painstaking labor with the first cruise miles.

## Extended Cruise Training

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Jan 82 p 2

[Article by Rear Admiral G. Shalygin: "Commander's Maturity"]

[Text] The large ASW [antisubmarine warfare] ship "Admiral Yumashev," which was then commanded by Captain 2d Rank A. Stefanov, was at anchorage on the open sea. The commander was in the cabin, but the remote communication post permitted him constantly to follow the situation. Far away in the sea a submarine surfaced. The ship's physician could not completely perform an urgent operation. The sick seaman required emergency assistance. There was a group of experienced physicians on board the "Admiral Yumashev."

Anticipating the flag officer's expected decision, Captain 2d Rank Stefanov climbed to the pilot house and ordered the urgent preparation of the ship for a cruise. When, as the officer had presumed, he was assigned the mission to rendezvous with the submarine the "Admiral Yumashev" had already completed weighing anchor.

"When will you be ready to get under way?" the operations duty officer asked the question.

"I am already under way," Stefanov answered.

The air maintained silence for several minutes. Evidently, they did not believe such efficiency there, on the flagship.

"With what speed are you moving?" the next question followed.

"Twenty-one knots," the commander reported.

"Your actions approved."

The "Admiral Yumashev" arrived at the rendezvous point considerably in advance of the assigned time. The seaman's life was saved.

This incident was not something exceptional for the ship and its commander. Simply, displayed in it once again was that high level of combat readiness in which the ASW ship "Admiral Yumashev" was constantly found when executing a long cruise and that high psychological frame of mind of Captain 2d Rank Stefanov for initiative and decisive actions which must be inherent to the highest degree in the commander of a contemporary ship which is accomplishing missions of a long cruise. And it is not for naught that officer A. Stefanov, who has to his credit several long cruises, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for successes in combat and political training and skillful operations at sea.

There are many criteria in accordance with which the maturity of a commander of a ship is checked at sea--knowledge and experience in the field of tactics, navigation, piloting and dead reckoning, and the ability to feel the pulse of the crew and train and indoctrinate subordinates. But with all this, we should especially distinguish the internal psychological frame of mind and the readiness of the commander for

actions under conditions which differ significantly from accustomed, base conditions. It is not enough to have a good impression and understanding of the requirements which the commander must meet on a cruise. It is necessary that these requirements become his internal platform and firm stereotype of behavior. For this, the officer must overpower the complex psychological barrier of the qualitative transition from the commander who is theoretically prepared to the commander who actually operates at sea in a combat manner. If this came easily, it would not be worth discussing. But placing his hand on his heart, each experienced commander can say that this psychological barrier, this threshold of maturity, at one time also proved to be a serious life's examination for him.

I recall my first departure on a long cruise as the commander of a nuclear submarine. It was a long wished for test and I prepared long years for it. But reality proved to be much more difficult than everything that had been mentally imagined or contemplated. From the very first days of the cruise I acutely felt the absence of an important point of support which I had become accustomed to find always in the senior commanders. On any cruise, in the most difficult questions which require the immediate decision and which the sea, the elements, or the situation pose, the commander most often remains at one with himself psychologically: he has no one to rely on, and the responsibility for making a decision lies with him alone.

For the commander of a ship, especially a submarine which most often operates independently, it is especially important never to lose presence of mind. His reaction to a change in the situation and inner state are immediately perceived by the crew.

Our ship had already been on a long cruise for many weeks and had entered the latitudes which in many respects were a riddle for us. The seamen were always in readiness for surprises, and they did not have to wait.

One day, having finished dinner, as usual I climbed to the plotting room. The ship was moving on the planned course on which we had encountered no one for a long time already. Suddenly, the sonarman on watch reported the noise of a ship's propellers: a submarine! The situation seemed unlikely. But all the specialists and I myself agreed on the correctness of the sonarman's report. Yes, a diesel submarine was moving on a parallel course with the same speed as ours. Suddenly it crossed our course with a sudden increase in speed and disappeared.

After a maneuver, our ship lay on its former course, but an alarming question stuck in each one's consciousness--just what was this submarine?

The next day, the pattern repeated itself exactly at the same time. I laid the tracing of yesterday's maneuvering on today's. Everything coincided. Once again, I undertook a study of the special features of the noises which are issued by schools of fish. Among them proved to be those which are extremely similar to the noises of the propellers of a diesel submarine. And immediately after dinner, we throw scraps of food overboard. There is the solution! It was a school of fish hurrying toward the scraps.

The next day, I decided to demonstrate the correctness of my assumption and specifically--"ordered" the time for the new appearance of the submarine. Five minutes prior to the designated moment I ordered shooting the scraps overboard, and the expected report from the sonarman arrived exactly at the indicated time.



Now this is perceived as a curiosity, but then this curiosity posed point-blank the question of the commander's professional competence and authority.

Naturally, the commander is subjected to the most serious tests in the course of accomplishing training combat missions on a long cruise, especially with actions as part of detachments and groups. If during training at the base or under conditions of familiar ranges he most often works out various actions in a certain sequence--from the simple to the complex--being concerned only for the level of his grades, on a joint long cruise, as a rule, missions are assigned to him in a single complex for the detachment or group of ships. The evaluation of the commander's personal actions always depends on the actual contribution to the common result. The volume of information which goes to the commander jumps sharply. Often he must master new tactical or special problems urgently and work out new procedures and new standards with the crew quickly. Nor should it be forgotten that ships and airplanes of the imperialist states often operate actively and, at times, frankly grossly in those areas where our ships are accomplishing training cruises. In short, peak loads with an acute shortage of time, which are comparatively rare at the base, are a usual phenomenon here, on a joint long cruise. And one cannot make a mistake or lose the common rhythm. This means that here, too, the psychological readiness of the commander to work with the maximum expenditure of effort is very important.

Such readiness is generated by the entire system of command training on long cruises which, as a rule, bear an especially practical character. Here consistent exactingness in evaluating the level of training of both the commander and the entire crew has great educational significance. It has become a strict rule that cruise staffs subject each ship which comes under their control to the most thorough and strictest check. And this, perhaps, is the first test of the commander's psychological readiness for the qualitative restructuring from the base, range way of thinking and actions to the ocean way. Such restructuring does not come easily to all, and not all are immediately imbued with its importance. But with the consistent exactingness of the flag officers and their staffs, a favorable result will come without fail.

They say: the sea teaches. But it does not teach by itself. At sea it is first of all the senior commanders and flag officers who, at times, did not formerly meet some of the commanders who have come under their command, who learn. Here the flag officers face an important task--to study their new subordinates quickly and deeply and become well acquainted with the level of their professional training. Even upon the first acquaintance with the commander of a ship, the experienced flag officer can form an impression of him rather exactly.

I recall how the senior commander met Captain 1st Rank V. Pykov, at that time commander of the ASW cruiser "Kiev," for the first time without seeing him, by means of communication. Behind the outwardly unhurried answers by the commander to the flag officer's questions, already in the course of the conversation one could feel the ability to consider a great number of versions for the accomplishment of assigned tasks. And this is how he actually turned out: clear, fast in an analysis of the situation, and rapid in adopting the optimum decisions.

Special opportunities open up before the flag officer to train commanders when staying directly on board their ships. Here it is important not only to demand strictly, but also to share experience and provide a correct reference point.



Captain 3d Rank P. Khomenko departed on a long cruise in the post of commander of a ship for the first time. And when the senior commander arrived on board this ship, there were many admonitions for the commander and for the crew. First of all, the ship was insufficiently ready to accomplish the role of a flagship in full measure. There was not a sufficiently high style of execution in the work of the officers.

Captain 3d Rank P. Khomenko correctly understood the requirements which had been imposed and managed to change the state of affairs on the ship in a short time. He eliminated his own shortcomings just as assiduously and gained experience. Unquestionably, being on a long cruise will become an excellent school for this commander. First, because he prepared himself well psychologically for it and a new cruise hardly requires his new reorientation. Unfortunately, as yet not all commanders, having returned to the base, continue to live with those requirements toward themselves that an ocean cruise dictated. And you see, it is important to consolidate what has been attained and move on farther.

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